Received: by 2002:a25:1506:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id 6csp713671ybv; Thu, 13 Feb 2020 08:12:05 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwM070xn3AayPmrsq0IHwBeCDOqVPL8tbiz66orEW/mDUQ3LkLPrHKzAJN0StpDhhwn4rJV X-Received: by 2002:a9d:6a2:: with SMTP id 31mr13755476otx.313.1581610324958; Thu, 13 Feb 2020 08:12:04 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1581610324; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=IN/0Nb4aN3i6xx22FSpj9MtrBo7y5uaSeQbmLG1H+Rqxo8FhCjvjUM0kI/2dWaF5rs RTIz4WIF88n3GkNYNh6EGXT5bKUXTw8OQbqRy5GiL4IClM4HfS32Eu9Jhy5W4Q1LGu8g yzKVzFoL9rNn0RyzdRjH/7/5bQsztx87WUhJ0od4uOBcGQTUc1ap/SyLqnmqf7AYkSxR khGSNzyxn+qwsqItoAiTAkB9QbJX+lEVovyPaFeU/U02xA5r+le4WWyu9YxXaBxuKHZJ SJXcEyZDtTxwMGV9RRBkYhU58QoO/rI5TMY4gJ8r/k++/+36G/HjnSz6v+5bYIGpr+YQ Cn6g== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=eGI0j2hs0c4ST38PXOiP7RTO17iGAuIxXDJR4Erw7hk=; b=VBg1xbUe6d5Zl2iL3qQHERD0uDZQvIpYWMvZgkPvI2njIq3P229iopH4znIqTxCP0B SiPHSpeOKc6gp+yOniSDZPsW79tjFQTTOz4hKggCBXzK5Lg3onAUIwsnEzOPG8J/rikU N2k4T2lUywVGgxffQw3sdF4RCL/zolo/RbjxcxxJxILQ1lvqkdzkq2ZljDezui0Q7iUP FQUXnFhTtoIxAgxTkNlu2L/iWuL0SiU+27lfgEbKuo5QVs2NgwRePoLLbPTxrFs9b4Fl Fag9H0LKz8ot4QOrSzwxbwt6BBf1wZAL8EayUX8M6rRaYTp0uDKNc9jGVsV7FiDyJmms NP3g== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=z8InTUvT; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n9si1200901ota.103.2020.02.13.08.11.50; Thu, 13 Feb 2020 08:12:04 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=z8InTUvT; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387451AbgBMQKn (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 13 Feb 2020 11:10:43 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60180 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727988AbgBMPWf (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Feb 2020 10:22:35 -0500 Received: from localhost (unknown [104.132.1.104]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id DED2324690; Thu, 13 Feb 2020 15:22:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1581607354; bh=mrU7RCK5WEhJt8eYqqolSqzoo9dFvW8eoP0dTn9M3zI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=z8InTUvTHoABgIaLOhIIP+9ebIgC7SLeVPuOAzyxDDPA4GWj31uN1CT9Say471/Jf xinSPo/rpFxl/WXlqWRzpWawA63RWdC+BXpi9EdqJ0Tfk5k5QiJbbhirlJa9o6cHIH GLvmNlzP6ps0XX+WrV0haBkutl8kU7YQtlhV1/nQ= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Nick Finco , Marios Pomonis , Andrew Honig , Jim Mattson , Paolo Bonzini Subject: [PATCH 4.4 36/91] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2020 07:19:53 -0800 Message-Id: <20200213151835.471940017@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.0 In-Reply-To: <20200213151821.384445454@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200213151821.384445454@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Marios Pomonis commit ea740059ecb37807ba47b84b33d1447435a8d868 upstream. This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and kvm_get_dr(). Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security perspective. Fixes: 020df0794f57 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code") Signed-off-by: Nick Finco Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS @@ -873,9 +874,11 @@ static u64 kvm_dr6_fixed(struct kvm_vcpu static int __kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val) { + size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db); + switch (dr) { case 0 ... 3: - vcpu->arch.db[dr] = val; + vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)] = val; if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) vcpu->arch.eff_db[dr] = val; break; @@ -912,9 +915,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_dr); int kvm_get_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long *val) { + size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db); + switch (dr) { case 0 ... 3: - *val = vcpu->arch.db[dr]; + *val = vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)]; break; case 4: /* fall through */