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Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: add rng-seed= command line option
To:     Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        kernel-team@android.com, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
        Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>,
        Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
        Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
        Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
References: <20200207150809.19329-1-salyzyn@android.com>
 <20200207155828.GB122530@mit.edu>
 <d35bacd4-ba3f-335d-85c4-57e87abd8e9a@android.com>
 <20200208004922.GE122530@mit.edu> <20200207195326.0344ef82@oasis.local.home>
 <20200213202454.f1bb0e65ccc429bde039111b@kernel.org>
 <20200214000343.a3b49deb2f0455568b371d0e@kernel.org>
 <2dc50225-10e2-01dc-c376-6f9e73087242@android.com>
 <20200214101630.0bad4830bec186c26d894caa@kernel.org>
From:   Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Message-ID: <5753e4f0-147c-45ad-692b-413e60df47a7@android.com>
Date:   Fri, 14 Feb 2020 09:02:01 -0800
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On 2/13/20 5:16 PM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
> Hi Mark,
>
> On Thu, 13 Feb 2020 10:44:59 -0800
> Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> wrote:
>
>> On 2/13/20 7:03 AM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
>>> On Thu, 13 Feb 2020 20:24:54 +0900
>>> Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>>> My preference would be to pass in the random seed *not* on the
>>>>>> command-line at all, but as a separate parameter which is passed to
>>>>>> the bootloader, just as we pass in the device-tree, the initrd and the
>>>>>> command-line as separate things.  The problem is that how we pass in
>>>>>> extra boot parameters is architecture specific, and how we might do it
>>>>>> for x86 is different than for arm64.  So yeah, it's a bit more
>>>>>> inconvenient to do things that way; but I think it's also much
>>>>>> cleaner.
>>>>> Hmm, if the boot loader could add on to the bootconfig that Masami just
>>>>> added, then it could add some "random" seed for each boot! The
>>>>> bootconfig is just an appended file at the end of the initrd.
>>>> Yeah, it is easy to add bootconfig support to a bootloader. It can add
>>>> a entropy number as "rng.seed=XXX" text after initrd image with size
>>>> and checksum. That is architecutre independent way to pass such hidden
>>>> parameter.
>>>> (hidden key must be filtered out when printing out the /proc/bootconfig,
>>>> but that is very easy too, just need a strncmp)
>>>>
>>> And here is the patch to support "random.rng_seed = XXX" option by
>>> bootconfig. Now you can focus on what you want to do. No need to
>>> modify command line strings.
>> LGTM, our virtualized emulator (cuttlefish) folks believe they can do it
>> this way. Albeit keep in mind that there are _thousands_ of embedded
>> bootloaders out there that are comfortable updating DT and kernel
>> command line, but few that add boot configs, so this may add complexity.
> I see, since the bootconfig is a new feature, it will take a time to
> be supported widely. Even though, maybe they can use DT for that
> purpose.
No for cuttlefish and KVM, there is no DT. WE will backport to 4.19 and 
5.4 Android kernels to grab bootconfig.
>
>> For our use case that caused us to need this, the cuttlefish Android
>> emulated device, not a problem though.
>>
>> However, the entropy _data_ has not been added (see below)
> Oh, I missed that.
>
>> Could you please formally re-submit your patch mhiramet@ with a change
>> to push the _data_ as well to the entropy?
> Yes, I'll do.

Thanks!

>
>> -- Mark
>>
>>> BTW, if you think you need to pass UTF-8 code as a data, I'm happy to
>>> update the bootconfig to support it. Just for the safeness, I have
>>> limited it by isprint() || isspace().
>>>
>>> Thank you,
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
>>> index 26956c006987..43fbbd307204 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
>>> @@ -554,6 +554,7 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU
>>>    
>>>    config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
>>>    	bool "Trust the bootloader to initialize Linux's CRNG"
>>> +	select BOOT_CONFIG
>>>    	help
>>>    	Some bootloaders can provide entropy to increase the kernel's initial
>>>    	device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the
>>> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
>>> index c7f9584de2c8..0ae33bbbd338 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
>>> @@ -2311,3 +2311,11 @@ void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
>>>    		add_device_randomness(buf, size);
>>>    }
>>>    EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
>>> +
>>> +#if defined(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)
>>> +/* caller called add_device_randomness, but it is from a trusted source */
>>> +void __init credit_trusted_entropy_bits(unsigned int nbits)
>>> +{
>>> +	credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, nbits);
>>> +}
>>> +#endif
>>> diff --git a/fs/proc/bootconfig.c b/fs/proc/bootconfig.c
>>> index 9955d75c0585..aace466c56ed 100644
>>> --- a/fs/proc/bootconfig.c
>>> +++ b/fs/proc/bootconfig.c
>>> @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ static int __init copy_xbc_key_value_list(char *dst, size_t size)
>>>    		ret = xbc_node_compose_key(leaf, key, XBC_KEYLEN_MAX);
>>>    		if (ret < 0)
>>>    			break;
>>> +		/* For keeping security reason, remove randomness key */
>>> +		if (!strcmp(key, RANDOM_SEED_XBC_KEY))
>>> +			continue;
>>>    		ret = snprintf(dst, rest(dst, end), "%s = ", key);
>>>    		if (ret < 0)
>>>    			break;
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
>>> index d319f9a1e429..c8f41ab4f342 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/random.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/random.h
>>> @@ -20,6 +20,13 @@ struct random_ready_callback {
>>>    
>>>    extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
>>>    extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
>>> +#if defined(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)
>>> +extern void __init credit_trusted_entropy_bits(unsigned int nbits);
>>> +#else
>>> +static inline void credit_trusted_entropy_bits(unsigned int nbits) {}
>>> +#endif
>>> +
>>> +#define RANDOM_SEED_XBC_KEY "random.rng_seed"
>>>    
>>>    #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
>>>    static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
>>> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
>>> index f95b014a5479..6c3f51bc76d5 100644
>>> --- a/init/main.c
>>> +++ b/init/main.c
>>> @@ -776,6 +776,32 @@ void __init __weak arch_call_rest_init(void)
>>>    	rest_init();
>>>    }
>>>    
>>> +static __always_inline void __init collect_entropy(const char *command_line)
>>> +{
>>> +	/*
>>> +	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
>>> +	 * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
>>> +	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
>>> +	 * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
>>> +	 * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
>>> +	 * - adding command line entropy
>>> +	 */
>>> +	rand_initialize();
>>> +	add_latent_entropy();
>>> +	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
>>> +	if (IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER)) {
>>> +		/*
>>> +		 * Added bootconfig device randomness above,
>> This part is incorrect, the rng_seed collected below was _not_ added to
>> the device_randomness.
>>
>> add_device_randomness(rng_seed, strlen(rng_seed)) needs to be pushed
>> below along with the credit.
> OK, as same as above command_line, I'll add that.
>
> Thank you,
>
>>> +		 * now add entropy credit for just random.rng_seed=<data>
>>> +		 */
>>> +		const char *rng_seed = xbc_find_value(RANDOM_SEED_XBC_KEY, NULL);
>>> +
>>> +		if (rng_seed)
>>> +			credit_trusted_entropy_bits(strlen(rng_seed) * 6);
>>> +	}
>>> +	boot_init_stack_canary();
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>    asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
>>>    {
>>>    	char *command_line;
>>> @@ -887,18 +913,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
>>>    	softirq_init();
>>>    	timekeeping_init();
>>>    
>>> -	/*
>>> -	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
>>> -	 * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
>>> -	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
>>> -	 * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
>>> -	 * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
>>> -	 * - adding command line entropy
>>> -	 */
>>> -	rand_initialize();
>>> -	add_latent_entropy();
>>> -	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
>>> -	boot_init_stack_canary();
>>> +	collect_entropy(command_line);
>>>    
>>>    	time_init();
>>>    	printk_safe_init();
>>>
>
-- MArk