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Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add additional efi tables for unencrypted
 mapping checks
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc:     Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
        platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
References: <9b52495a2d8adfc8f2d731a0236c945196143ef4.1582644865.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
 <CAKv+Gu_3=u1S1dgmjMH+0-7GhD+v3YvgQvqEUx7QSDjPMW1HVw@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-ID: <5705e8ab-c8f1-77c3-0bda-4687a53a73ea@amd.com>
Date:   Tue, 25 Feb 2020 11:40:40 -0600
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On 2/25/20 10:09 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 at 16:34, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>>
>> When booting with SME active, EFI tables must be mapped unencrypted since
>> they were built by UEFI in unencrypted memory. Update the list of tables
>> to be checked during early_memremap() processing to account for new EFI
>> tables.
>>
>> This fixes a bug where an EFI TPM log table has been created by UEFI, but
>> it lives in memory that has been marked as usable rather than reserved.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> 
> Thanks Tom
> 
> Mind respinning this on top of efi/next?

Sure, no problem, v2 on the way. I wasn't sure if this would go through
the x86 tree or the efi tree (though this should apply cleanly to efi/next
with just a few lines of offset).

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git/>
> Thanks,
> 
> 
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++
>>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> index ae923ee8e2b4..eba5038c7a44 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE
>>         &rci2_table_phys,
>>  #endif
>> +       &efi.rng_seed,
>> +       &efi.tpm_log,
>> +       &efi.tpm_final_log,
>>  };
>>
>>  u64 efi_setup;         /* efi setup_data physical address */
>> --
>> 2.17.1
>>