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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Add additional efi tables for unencrypted
 mapping checks
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc:     Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
        linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
        platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
References: <261ea8108c6290e95962be2638bd204f90787c1c.1582652466.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
 <CAKv+Gu_FJeiaY5yw9=ER4XyBZrDFZ5L4igrqxP6hhJ7Z8easpw@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-ID: <9e16fed9-4399-5c78-cbfb-6be75c295f31@amd.com>
Date:   Tue, 25 Feb 2020 11:54:23 -0600
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On 2/25/20 11:45 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Tue, 25 Feb 2020 at 18:41, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>>
>> When booting with SME active, EFI tables must be mapped unencrypted since
>> they were built by UEFI in unencrypted memory. Update the list of tables
>> to be checked during early_memremap() processing to account for new EFI
>> tables.
>>
>> This fixes a bug where an EFI TPM log table has been created by UEFI, but
>> it lives in memory that has been marked as usable rather than reserved.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>
>> ---
>> Changes since v1:
>> - Re-spun against EFI tree
> 
> Which one? Surely not the one in the link I included?

I did a git clone of

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git

and checked out branch next. Not sure what I missed...

Thanks,
Tom

> 
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++
>>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> index 43b24e149312..c6ca959e2366 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE
>>         &rci2_table_phys,
>>  #endif
>> +       &efi.rng_seed,
>> +       &efi.tpm_log,
>> +       &efi.tpm_final_log,
>>  };
>>
>>  u64 efi_setup;         /* efi setup_data physical address */
>> --
>> 2.17.1
>>