Received: by 2002:a25:c205:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id s5csp226286ybf; Wed, 26 Feb 2020 11:57:31 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzW2OX2G6y0q4JbGo2h4kPFRq3yNogDudMsGsDfXwEu9sdAmST2rQKqYRhjUxiXgVeoL3kN X-Received: by 2002:a05:6830:1651:: with SMTP id h17mr320924otr.167.1582747051366; Wed, 26 Feb 2020 11:57:31 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1582747051; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=SqH8RUuR/30nVchw1atrLw3tU1oVh/lDCii96vz7zcKFQ7u/DGga03zBVjUWw5wS6M akpnlx6BhGsrNhTetVTZsvP+u6XZ5VihKG9tEXNGKETCEE52l6jNeh1VuY4DGfIJxCtk TVC2f/tTxkYdOuqwqS7KoEsftND7PUhP5r7BpGpeAo9RWXDRKrQgVrjhcd0ks1jCy5lO JGh8bHIXR1mzj7+JaghkEFOSXFTo9NisCfYvu5QLzUpcwnk/Z1ZiWAHRpemNK3qHShMx llMEQocKN3Oxt0ImMeW66YercigvhXv2i7HpWAUF9odEe9RcK7ckfY1Xn6yNrWpCONu4 11rw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc :to:from:date; bh=EnrK/i5siaxZ0vKGhANfxDEFxUca/nUcl1gp0tY7Vps=; b=b4FAbPr8ja1w4AHAldoTxJ+LVwAZQqwWrwf44sCsCQVoO2trAdshW26mM66UbWiagE nFW/rOGE/Ul8M7FNkUzSqUFVYTxIFzZ0+0OEeWR36MdGn3HlDw/4aPenF/d7CZBMwJuu a2x4AJY6KW/Gu1lDFm1biIUEyRA5YQ5tfZ2nT2DyhGyiuc1ShROSFbrbvfiS6rjPGpvS 2C7a6x0SSDDisiLQG7PTHtBn7DxLpSvfFoS6pbh2uP0JyzJl6hEphwEHCfn3Rba6DTUs QRDyRNEcuWHiKcRztqvtJhniY9qnKPHqFDwmpObj8Q4zgPoMl1aRoaCaDmnOmalFIkK2 4svw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id o15si251127otp.314.2020.02.26.11.57.19; Wed, 26 Feb 2020 11:57:31 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727304AbgBZT5O (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 26 Feb 2020 14:57:14 -0500 Received: from jabberwock.ucw.cz ([46.255.230.98]:54622 "EHLO jabberwock.ucw.cz" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727244AbgBZT5N (ORCPT ); Wed, 26 Feb 2020 14:57:13 -0500 Received: by jabberwock.ucw.cz (Postfix, from userid 1017) id C1A811C036E; Wed, 26 Feb 2020 20:57:10 +0100 (CET) Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 20:57:10 +0100 From: Pavel Machek To: Dave Hansen Cc: Yu-cheng Yu , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , x86-patch-review@intel.com Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack protection Message-ID: <20200226195710.6sma4whvs3o76oux@ucw.cz> References: <20200205181935.3712-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20200205181935.3712-6-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <597fb45a-cb94-e8e7-8e80-45a26766d32a@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <597fb45a-cb94-e8e7-8e80-45a26766d32a@intel.com> User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > On 2/5/20 10:19 AM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote: > > Introduce Kconfig option: X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER. > > > > Shadow Stack (SHSTK) provides protection against function return address > > corruption. It is active when the kernel has this feature enabled, and > > both the processor and the application support it. When this feature is > > enabled, legacy non-SHSTK applications continue to work, but without SHSTK > > protection. > > > > The user-mode SHSTK protection is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. > > IA32 applications are supported under the compatibility mode. > > I think what you're trying to say here is that the hardware supports > shadow stacks with 32-bit kernels. However, this series does not > include that support and we have no plans to add it. > > Right? > > I'll let others weigh in, but I rather dislike the use of acronyms here. > I'd much rather see the english "shadow stack" everywhere than SHSTK. For the record, I like "shadow stack" better, too.