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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b8si1813460otf.32.2020.02.27.06.48.12; Thu, 27 Feb 2020 06:48:24 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=t8LzMz3T; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730121AbgB0NoD (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 27 Feb 2020 08:44:03 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:39322 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730084AbgB0Nn5 (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Feb 2020 08:43:57 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7A24120726; Thu, 27 Feb 2020 13:43:56 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1582811037; bh=QIxfv9IqXqjEULyp9k88AQixp8pBPBBWvgWwqIt/4mo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=t8LzMz3TY4jOLGLEF8BQDt++DvJ7xDIco36Ukezx/y+4lYo3bwQalK0tbC+dqTymF Lpd6njQVV9D3AodkYLelwmgIOKisszltmiUh5gAWOLX39J1qt+KHshZ4r5k+As+51w yVWPdgxMF9yXswjtjIeNqSz8jA7Mebl6pxqi7aRg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Pietro Oliva , Larry Finger Subject: [PATCH 4.4 091/113] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2020 14:36:47 +0100 Message-Id: <20200227132226.305495221@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200227132211.791484803@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200227132211.791484803@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Larry Finger commit 499c405b2b80bb3a04425ba3541d20305e014d3e upstream. In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory. Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16"). Reported by: Pietro Oliva Cc: Pietro Oliva Cc: Stable Fixes: a2c60d42d97c ("staging: r8188eu: Add files for new driver - part 16") Signed-off-by: Larry Finger Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210180235.21691-2-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c @@ -2859,7 +2859,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_ goto out; } - if (!p->pointer) { + if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(struct ieee_param)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; }