Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1030194AbWBMWI1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Feb 2006 17:08:27 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S964871AbWBMWI1 (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Feb 2006 17:08:27 -0500 Received: from [194.90.237.34] ([194.90.237.34]:54749 "EHLO mtlexch01.mtl.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S964870AbWBMWI0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Feb 2006 17:08:26 -0500 Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2006 00:09:47 +0200 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" To: Hugh Dickins Cc: Linus Torvalds , William Irwin , Roland Dreier , Nick Piggin , Gleb Natapov , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Linux Kernel Mailing List , openib-general@openib.org, Petr Vandrovec , Badari Pulavarty Subject: Re: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK Message-ID: <20060213220947.GD13603@mellanox.co.il> Reply-To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" References: <20060213154114.GO32041@mellanox.co.il> <20060213210906.GC13603@mellanox.co.il> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2.1i X-OriginalArrivalTime: 13 Feb 2006 22:10:15.0984 (UTC) FILETIME=[44B52300:01C630EA] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1277 Lines: 35 Quoting r. Hugh Dickins : > Subject: Re: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK > > On Mon, 13 Feb 2006, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > Like this then? > > Almost. I would still prefer madvise_vma to allow MADV_DONTFORK > on a VM_IO vma, even though it must prohibit MADV_DOFORK there. > But if Linus disagrees, of course ignore me. I'm not sure about this point. Linus? > Comments much better, thanks. I didn't get your point about mlock'd > memory, but I'm content to believe you're thinking of an issue that > hasn't occurred to me. I'm referring to the follwing, from man mlock(2): "Cryptographic security software often handles critical bytes like passwords or secret keys as data structures. As a result of paging, these secrets could be transfered onto a persistent swap store medium, where they might be accessible to the enemy long after the security software has erased the secrets in RAM and terminated." -- Michael S. Tsirkin Staff Engineer, Mellanox Technologies - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/