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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:57:01 -0000 Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.62]) by b06avi18878370.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 022Ev0Pt23396720 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:57:00 GMT Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A225AE051; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:57:00 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08EFBAE053; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:56:59 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.229.179]) by d06av26.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 2 Mar 2020 14:56:58 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies From: Mimi Zohar To: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Nayna Jain , linux-integrity , linuxppc-dev , linux-efi , linux-s390 , Martin Schwidefsky , Philipp Rudo , Michael Ellerman , Linux Kernel Mailing List Date: Mon, 02 Mar 2020 09:56:58 -0500 In-Reply-To: References: <1582744207-25969-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> <1583160524.8544.91.camel@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 20030214-0020-0000-0000-000003AF9FA8 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 20030214-0021-0000-0000-00002207CB39 Message-Id: <1583161018.8544.96.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138,18.0.572 definitions=2020-03-02_05:2020-03-02,2020-03-02 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 malwarescore=0 spamscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 suspectscore=0 adultscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 clxscore=1015 priorityscore=1501 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2001150001 definitions=main-2003020110 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2020-03-02 at 15:52 +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Mon, 2 Mar 2020 at 15:48, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > On Wed, 2020-02-26 at 14:10 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote: > > > Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific > > > functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA > > > include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch > > > defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing > > > the different architectures to select it. > > > > > > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds > > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain > > > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > > > Cc: Martin Schwidefsky > > > Cc: Philipp Rudo > > > Cc: Michael Ellerman > > > --- > > > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +- > > > arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 + > > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > > > include/linux/ima.h | 3 +-- > > > security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ > > > 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > > index 497b7d0b2d7e..b8ce1b995633 100644 > > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > > @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ config PPC > > > select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE > > > select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK > > > select VIRT_TO_BUS if !PPC64 > > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if PPC_SECURE_BOOT > > > # > > > # Please keep this list sorted alphabetically. > > > # > > > @@ -978,7 +979,6 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT > > > prompt "Enable secure boot support" > > > bool > > > depends on PPC_POWERNV > > > - depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > > help > > > Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security > > > policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user > > > diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig > > > index 8abe77536d9d..90ff3633ade6 100644 > > > --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig > > > +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig > > > @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ config S390 > > > select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED > > > select SWIOTLB > > > select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR > > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > > > > > > > > config SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > > index beea77046f9b..cafa66313fe2 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > > > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > > @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ config X86 > > > select VIRT_TO_BUS > > > select X86_FEATURE_NAMES if PROC_FS > > > select PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS if PROC_FS > > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI > > > > Not everyone is interested in enabling IMA or requiring IMA runtime > > policies. With this patch, enabling IMA_ARCH_POLICY is therefore > > still left up to the person building the kernel. As a result, I'm > > seeing the following warning, which is kind of cool. > > > > WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for > > IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > Depends on [n]: INTEGRITY [=y] && IMA [=y] && IMA_ARCH_POLICY [=n] > > Selected by [y]: > > - X86 [=y] && EFI [=y] > > > > Ard, Michael, Martin, just making sure this type of warning is > > acceptable before upstreaming this patch. I would appreciate your > > tags. > > > > Ehm, no, warnings like these are not really acceptable. It means there > is an inconsistency in the way the Kconfig dependencies are defined. > > Does this help: > > select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI && IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > ? Yes, that's fine for x86.  Michael, Martin, do you want something similar or would you prefer actually selecting IMA_ARCH_POLICY? Mimi