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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 4 Mar 2020 12:55:42 -0000 Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.58]) by b06avi18626390.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 024CsgYl33948012 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 4 Mar 2020 12:54:42 GMT Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F6C64C050; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 12:55:40 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3482B4C046; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 12:55:39 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.200.112]) by d06av22.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 4 Mar 2020 12:55:39 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies From: Mimi Zohar To: Ard Biesheuvel , Nayna Jain , Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-integrity , linuxppc-dev , linux-efi , linux-s390 , Philipp Rudo , Michael Ellerman , Linux Kernel Mailing List , x86@kernel.org Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2020 07:55:38 -0500 In-Reply-To: References: <1583289211-5420-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 20030412-0012-0000-0000-0000038D17CB X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 20030412-0013-0000-0000-000021C9D293 Message-Id: <1583326538.6264.32.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138,18.0.572 definitions=2020-03-04_03:2020-03-04,2020-03-04 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 lowpriorityscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 adultscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 impostorscore=0 clxscore=1015 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2001150001 definitions=main-2003040099 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org [Cc'ing Thomas Gleixner and x86 mailing list] On Wed, 2020-03-04 at 08:14 +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Wed, 4 Mar 2020 at 03:34, Nayna Jain wrote: > > > > Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific > > functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA > > include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch > > defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing > > the different architectures to select it. > > > > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain > > Cc: Ard Biesheuvel > > Cc: Philipp Rudo > > Cc: Michael Ellerman > > Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Thanks, Ard. > > for the x86 bits, but I'm not an x86 maintainer. Also, you may need to > split this if you want to permit arch maintainers to pick up their > parts individually. Michael, Philipp, Thomas, do you prefer separate patches? > > > --- > > v2: > > * Fixed the issue identified by Mimi. Thanks Mimi, Ard, Heiko and Michael for > > discussing the fix. > > > > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + > > arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 + > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > > include/linux/ima.h | 3 +-- > > security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ > > 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > index 497b7d0b2d7e..a5cfde432983 100644 > > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > > @@ -979,6 +979,7 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT > > bool > > depends on PPC_POWERNV > > depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > help > > Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security > > policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user > > diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig > > index 8abe77536d9d..4a502fbcb800 100644 > > --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig > > @@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ config S390 > > select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED > > select SWIOTLB > > select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > > > > > config SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > index beea77046f9b..7f5bfaf0cbd2 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > > @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ config X86 > > select VIRT_TO_BUS > > select X86_FEATURE_NAMES if PROC_FS > > select PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS if PROC_FS > > + select IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI && IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > > > config INSTRUCTION_DECODER > > def_bool y > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > > index 1659217e9b60..aefe758f4466 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > > @@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); > > extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); > > #endif > > > > -#if (defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)) || defined(CONFIG_S390) \ > > - || defined(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) > > +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); > > extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); > > #else > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > index 3f3ee4e2eb0d..d17972aa413a 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > > @@ -327,3 +327,12 @@ config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS > > depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS > > depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING > > default y > > + > > +config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT > > + bool > > + depends on IMA > > + depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY > > Doesn't the latter already depend on the former? Yes, there's no need for the first. Mimi > > > + default n > > + help > > + This option is selected by architectures to enable secure and/or > > + trusted boot based on IMA runtime policies. > > -- > > 2.13.6 > >