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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id a26si5890312oic.91.2020.03.10.11.21.27; Tue, 10 Mar 2020 11:21:39 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726752AbgCJSTy (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 10 Mar 2020 14:19:54 -0400 Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:49185 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726436AbgCJSTy (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Mar 2020 14:19:54 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga101.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 10 Mar 2020 11:19:53 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,537,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="236024744" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.202]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 10 Mar 2020 11:19:52 -0700 Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 11:19:52 -0700 From: Sean Christopherson To: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky , Paolo Bonzini Subject: Re: [PATCH 4.14 057/126] KVM: SVM: Override default MMIO mask if memory encryption is enabled Message-ID: <20200310181952.GF9305@linux.intel.com> References: <20200310124203.704193207@linuxfoundation.org> <20200310124207.819562318@linuxfoundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200310124207.819562318@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Has this been tested on the stable kernels? There's a recent bug report[*] that suggests the 4.19 backport of this patch may be causing issues. [*] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206795 On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 01:41:18PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > From: Tom Lendacky > > commit 52918ed5fcf05d97d257f4131e19479da18f5d16 upstream. > > The KVM MMIO support uses bit 51 as the reserved bit to cause nested page > faults when a guest performs MMIO. The AMD memory encryption support uses > a CPUID function to define the encryption bit position. Given this, it is > possible that these bits can conflict. > > Use svm_hardware_setup() to override the MMIO mask if memory encryption > support is enabled. Various checks are performed to ensure that the mask > is properly defined and rsvd_bits() is used to generate the new mask (as > was done prior to the change that necessitated this patch). > > Fixes: 28a1f3ac1d0c ("kvm: x86: Set highest physical address bits in non-present/reserved SPTEs") > Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson > Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman > > --- > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+) > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -1088,6 +1088,47 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_t > return 0; > } > > +/* > + * The default MMIO mask is a single bit (excluding the present bit), > + * which could conflict with the memory encryption bit. Check for > + * memory encryption support and override the default MMIO mask if > + * memory encryption is enabled. > + */ > +static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void) > +{ > + unsigned int enc_bit, mask_bit; > + u64 msr, mask; > + > + /* If there is no memory encryption support, use existing mask */ > + if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) < 0x8000001f) > + return; > + > + /* If memory encryption is not enabled, use existing mask */ > + rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr); > + if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT)) > + return; > + > + enc_bit = cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) & 0x3f; > + mask_bit = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits; > + > + /* Increment the mask bit if it is the same as the encryption bit */ > + if (enc_bit == mask_bit) > + mask_bit++; > + > + /* > + * If the mask bit location is below 52, then some bits above the > + * physical addressing limit will always be reserved, so use the > + * rsvd_bits() function to generate the mask. This mask, along with > + * the present bit, will be used to generate a page fault with > + * PFER.RSV = 1. > + * > + * If the mask bit location is 52 (or above), then clear the mask. > + */ > + mask = (mask_bit < 52) ? rsvd_bits(mask_bit, 51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK : 0; > + > + kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK); > +} > + > static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) > { > int cpu; > @@ -1123,6 +1164,8 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(voi > kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE); > } > > + svm_adjust_mmio_mask(); > + > for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { > r = svm_cpu_init(cpu); > if (r) > >