Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CAG48ez0G3JkMq61gUmyQAaCq=_TwHbi1XKzWRooxZkv08PQKuw@mail.gmail.com>
 <20200310184814.GA8447@dhcp22.suse.cz> <CAKOZueua_v8jHCpmEtTB6f3i9e2YnmX4mqdYVWhV4E=Z-n+zRQ@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAKOZueua_v8jHCpmEtTB6f3i9e2YnmX4mqdYVWhV4E=Z-n+zRQ@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Date:   Tue, 10 Mar 2020 22:40:00 +0100
Message-ID: <CAG48ez2EWzn_xm0Q3YaPjSXrhVAAOUUvNDyDQ+jpgavmN6wLvQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: interaction of MADV_PAGEOUT with CoW anonymous mappings?
To:     Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc:     Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>, Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 9:19 PM Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 11:48 AM Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > On Tue 10-03-20 19:08:28, Jann Horn wrote:
> > > >From looking at the source code, it looks to me as if using
> > > MADV_PAGEOUT on a CoW anonymous mapping will page out the page if
> > > possible, even if other processes still have the same page mapped. Is
> > > that correct?
> > >
> > > If so, that's probably bad in environments where many processes (with
> > > different privileges) are forked from a single zygote process (like
> > > Android and Chrome), I think? If you accidentally call it on a CoW
> > > anonymous mapping with shared pages, you'll degrade the performance of
> > > other processes. And if an attacker does it intentionally, they could
> > > use that to aid with exploiting race conditions or weird
> > > microarchitectural stuff (e.g. the new https://lviattack.eu/lvi.pdf
> > > talks about "the assumption that attackers can provoke page faults or
> > > microcode assists for (arbitrary) load operations in the victim
> > > domain").
> > >
> > > Should madvise_cold_or_pageout_pte_range() maybe refuse to operate on
> > > pages with mapcount>1, or something like that? Or does it already do
> > > that, and I just missed the check?
> >
> > I have brought up side channel attacks earlier [1] but only in the
> > context of shared page cache pages. I didn't really consider shared
> > anonymous pages to be a real problem. I was under impression that CoW
> > pages shouldn't be a real problem because any security sensible
> > applications shouldn't allow untrusted code to be forked and CoW
> > anything really important. I believe we have made this assumption
> > in other places - IIRC on gup with FOLL_FORCE but I admit I have
> > very happily forgot most details.
>
> I'm more worried about the performance implications. Consider
> libc.so's data section: that's a COW mapping, and we COW it during
> zygote initialization as we load and relocate libc.so. Child processes
> shouldn't be dirtying and re-COWing those relocated pages. If I
> understand Jann's message correctly, MADV_PAGEOUT would force the
> pages corresponding to the libc.so data segment out to zram just
> because we MADV_PAGEOUT-ed a single process that happened to use libc.
> We should leave those pages in memory, IMHO.

Actually, the libc.so data section is a file mapping, so I think
can_do_pageout() would decide whether the caller is allowed to force
pageout based on whether the caller is the owner of (or capable over)
libc (in other words, root, basically). But I think the bss section,
as well as heap memory, could have pageout forced by anyone.