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Date:   Wed, 11 Mar 2020 16:28:58 +0000
From:   Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To:     Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc:     Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
        Amit Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
        Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
        "H . J . Lu " <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
        Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
        Kristina =?utf-8?Q?Mart=C5=A1enko?= <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
        Sudakshina Das <sudi.das@arm.com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/11] arm64: Branch Target Identification support
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On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 12:42:26PM +0000, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 09, 2020 at 09:05:05PM +0000, Mark Brown wrote:
> > On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 10:27:29AM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> 
> > > Does this series affect uprobes in any way? I.e. can you probe a landing
> > > pad?
> 
> > You can't probe a landing pad, uprobes on landing pads will be silently
> > ignored so the program isn't disrupted, you just don't get the expected
> > trace from those uprobes.  This isn't new with the BTI support since
> > the landing pads are generally pointer auth instructions, these already
> > can't be probed regardless of what's going on with this series.  It's
> > already on the list to get sorted.
> 
> Sorry, I realized thanks to Amit's off-list prompting that I was testing
> that I was verifying with the wrong kernel binary here (user error since
> it took me a while to sort out uprobes) so this isn't quite right - you
> can probe the landing pads with or without this series.

Can we not change aarch64_insn_is_nop() to actually return true only for
NOP and ignore everything else in the hint space? We tend to re-use the
hint instructions for new things in the architecture, so I'd rather
white-list what we know we can safely probe than black-listing only some
of the hint instructions.

I haven't assessed the effort of doing the above (probably not a lot)
but as a short-term workaround we could add the BTI and PAC hint
instructions to the aarch64_insn_is_nop() (though my preferred option is
the white-list one).

-- 
Catalin