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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id h125si3010488oia.253.2020.03.12.13.27.00; Thu, 12 Mar 2020 13:27:12 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727195AbgCLU0X (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 12 Mar 2020 16:26:23 -0400 Received: from mga06.intel.com ([134.134.136.31]:10402 "EHLO mga06.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725268AbgCLU0R (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Mar 2020 16:26:17 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga006.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.51]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Mar 2020 13:26:16 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,545,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="246490321" Received: from saurabhd-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.251.16.241]) ([10.251.16.241]) by orsmga006.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 12 Mar 2020 13:26:16 -0700 Subject: Re: interaction of MADV_PAGEOUT with CoW anonymous mappings? To: Minchan Kim , Michal Hocko Cc: Jann Horn , Linux-MM , kernel list , Daniel Colascione , "Joel Fernandes (Google)" , Andrew Morton References: <20200312082248.GS23944@dhcp22.suse.cz> <20200312201602.GA68817@google.com> From: Dave Hansen Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= mQINBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABtEVEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gKEludGVsIFdvcmsgQWRkcmVzcykgPGRhdmUuaGFuc2VuQGludGVs LmNvbT6JAjgEEwECACIFAlQ+9J0CGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEGg1 lTBwyZKwLZUP/0dnbhDc229u2u6WtK1s1cSd9WsflGXGagkR6liJ4um3XCfYWDHvIdkHYC1t MNcVHFBwmQkawxsYvgO8kXT3SaFZe4ISfB4K4CL2qp4JO+nJdlFUbZI7cz/Td9z8nHjMcWYF IQuTsWOLs/LBMTs+ANumibtw6UkiGVD3dfHJAOPNApjVr+M0P/lVmTeP8w0uVcd2syiaU5jB aht9CYATn+ytFGWZnBEEQFnqcibIaOrmoBLu2b3fKJEd8Jp7NHDSIdrvrMjYynmc6sZKUqH2 I1qOevaa8jUg7wlLJAWGfIqnu85kkqrVOkbNbk4TPub7VOqA6qG5GCNEIv6ZY7HLYd/vAkVY E8Plzq/NwLAuOWxvGrOl7OPuwVeR4hBDfcrNb990MFPpjGgACzAZyjdmYoMu8j3/MAEW4P0z F5+EYJAOZ+z212y1pchNNauehORXgjrNKsZwxwKpPY9qb84E3O9KYpwfATsqOoQ6tTgr+1BR CCwP712H+E9U5HJ0iibN/CDZFVPL1bRerHziuwuQuvE0qWg0+0SChFe9oq0KAwEkVs6ZDMB2 P16MieEEQ6StQRlvy2YBv80L1TMl3T90Bo1UUn6ARXEpcbFE0/aORH/jEXcRteb+vuik5UGY 5TsyLYdPur3TXm7XDBdmmyQVJjnJKYK9AQxj95KlXLVO38lcuQINBFRjzmoBEACyAxbvUEhd GDGNg0JhDdezyTdN8C9BFsdxyTLnSH31NRiyp1QtuxvcqGZjb2trDVuCbIzRrgMZLVgo3upr MIOx1CXEgmn23Zhh0EpdVHM8IKx9Z7V0r+rrpRWFE8/wQZngKYVi49PGoZj50ZEifEJ5qn/H Nsp2+Y+bTUjDdgWMATg9DiFMyv8fvoqgNsNyrrZTnSgoLzdxr89FGHZCoSoAK8gfgFHuO54B lI8QOfPDG9WDPJ66HCodjTlBEr/Cwq6GruxS5i2Y33YVqxvFvDa1tUtl+iJ2SWKS9kCai2DR 3BwVONJEYSDQaven/EHMlY1q8Vln3lGPsS11vSUK3QcNJjmrgYxH5KsVsf6PNRj9mp8Z1kIG qjRx08+nnyStWC0gZH6NrYyS9rpqH3j+hA2WcI7De51L4Rv9pFwzp161mvtc6eC/GxaiUGuH BNAVP0PY0fqvIC68p3rLIAW3f97uv4ce2RSQ7LbsPsimOeCo/5vgS6YQsj83E+AipPr09Caj 0hloj+hFoqiticNpmsxdWKoOsV0PftcQvBCCYuhKbZV9s5hjt9qn8CE86A5g5KqDf83Fxqm/ vXKgHNFHE5zgXGZnrmaf6resQzbvJHO0Fb0CcIohzrpPaL3YepcLDoCCgElGMGQjdCcSQ+Ci FCRl0Bvyj1YZUql+ZkptgGjikQARAQABiQIfBBgBAgAJBQJUY85qAhsMAAoJEGg1lTBwyZKw l4IQAIKHs/9po4spZDFyfDjunimEhVHqlUt7ggR1Hsl/tkvTSze8pI1P6dGp2XW6AnH1iayn yRcoyT0ZJ+Zmm4xAH1zqKjWplzqdb/dO28qk0bPso8+1oPO8oDhLm1+tY+cOvufXkBTm+whm +AyNTjaCRt6aSMnA/QHVGSJ8grrTJCoACVNhnXg/R0g90g8iV8Q+IBZyDkG0tBThaDdw1B2l asInUTeb9EiVfL/Zjdg5VWiF9LL7iS+9hTeVdR09vThQ/DhVbCNxVk+DtyBHsjOKifrVsYep WpRGBIAu3bK8eXtyvrw1igWTNs2wazJ71+0z2jMzbclKAyRHKU9JdN6Hkkgr2nPb561yjcB8 sIq1pFXKyO+nKy6SZYxOvHxCcjk2fkw6UmPU6/j/nQlj2lfOAgNVKuDLothIxzi8pndB8Jju KktE5HJqUUMXePkAYIxEQ0mMc8Po7tuXdejgPMwgP7x65xtfEqI0RuzbUioFltsp1jUaRwQZ MTsCeQDdjpgHsj+P2ZDeEKCbma4m6Ez/YWs4+zDm1X8uZDkZcfQlD9NldbKDJEXLIjYWo1PH hYepSffIWPyvBMBTW2W5FRjJ4vLRrJSUoEfJuPQ3vW9Y73foyo/qFoURHO48AinGPZ7PC7TF vUaNOTjKedrqHkaOcqB185ahG2had0xnFsDPlx5y Message-ID: <501cce5b-005a-f559-7c5b-f574d1d65deb@intel.com> Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2020 13:26:16 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.9.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200312201602.GA68817@google.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 3/12/20 1:16 PM, Minchan Kim wrote: > On Thu, Mar 12, 2020 at 09:22:48AM +0100, Michal Hocko wrote: > I't likde to wait Jann's reply since Dave gave his opinion about the vulnerability. > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cf95db88-968d-fee5-1c15-10d024c09d8a@intel.com/ > Jann, could you give your insigh about that practically it's possible? FWIW, just checking for mapcount>=1 seems like a pretty sane fix to me. I went looking at doing it another way, but Michal was quite correct. We'd probably end up having to special-case something underneath shrink_page_list(). > A real dumb question to understand vulnerability: > > The attacker would be able to trigger heavy memory consumption so that he > could make paging them out without MADV_PAGEOUT. I know MADV_PAGEOUT makes > it easier but he still could do without MADV_PAGEOUT. > What makes difference here? Causing memory pressure is quite a bit more disruptive than MADV_PAGEOUT. It's a much more blunt instrument and is likely to result in a lot of collateral damage and a lot of I/O. MADV_PAGEOUT is *surgical*. You can target one very specific page if, for instance, you think that your victim is reading it in a way that is vulnerable. You can also do it with zero I/O (after the initial pageout). > To clarify how MADV_PAGEWORK works: > If other process has accessed the page so that his page table has access > bit marked, MADV_PAGEOUT couldn't page it out. The attacker doesn't need to get the victim to get a major fault, it just needs to induce *a* fault. I actually did an experiment to see how this would work in practice. 1. Allocate some memory(), touch it 2. fork() 3. In the parent: Loop reading the memory 4. In the child: loop running MADV_PAGEOUT The pages stayed in the swap cache and the parent reading the memory saw a constant stream of faults.