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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id t132si4827743oih.173.2020.03.13.09.17.11; Fri, 13 Mar 2020 09:17:33 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20161025 header.b=ggK3KIuW; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726652AbgCMQPp (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 13 Mar 2020 12:15:45 -0400 Received: from mail-oi1-f194.google.com ([209.85.167.194]:33498 "EHLO mail-oi1-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726480AbgCMQPp (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 Mar 2020 12:15:45 -0400 Received: by mail-oi1-f194.google.com with SMTP id r7so9973147oij.0 for ; Fri, 13 Mar 2020 09:15:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ItqazNtvdRJuwEbZG7KQ5fbAxT8GhXH9Ce1D20Tz2pA=; b=ggK3KIuW2JsDMzYu3mz6vjaNJcfkE5lqGHzIPtmrWJ9sTiYWac0N72xDRv2ZBkdq7/ Sjg87SudHddUrizqo2vbO6VXiGC2hkbLzKR9HZY4t+RyZDw0T7naYBNICP/rpozy9FRP 7Q+hKNMRed7zDwlI4YWtDXMqCBrmsJH9mwdk4nVhzBHKNQQus8cNZ/w4O4WpvrYcY6lo vOPdHiG/bVrGlJ2wdeHSGnmql+pGGn5LCM6SM+AFRyx00zds0FVFmlmTjJmifInxTZzI GPC1xtGVvcTXYs41oKdgyO//XHOiCaDpYGndj83leZO227uE7SvN8KCsmccCfdFM+A16 ip0Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ItqazNtvdRJuwEbZG7KQ5fbAxT8GhXH9Ce1D20Tz2pA=; b=PTjsezZBP6FOCqfRKHkRjXGQx8IeXv0ZPLTrLbJR45LxaVi9LPTPaVC74TbYbHAO9H WXMjM7gBpXDeeeyS0w18F7B32XUsplgIe3/odtyyvOBnlKuOIDgNpbRzICAKRjQZh0pr ng/Hyy4LXJ1eYx69LNGjqLzwmeunCQtE81X1ElnJuGhH+3Fb8afEDzt7xA4y6Q43CsCq 1O19tXAEWN3sKpY4w6ovpLcBfg8vGcV9+SsSRjsAE6G1fRcG7cr2v4WdwTC2XZLWaoT9 6C45twDAyLyLjl/VRSHJxEGpth9LeHIoJ8ziNsYobTLWIcYT42LXR1INyv8TjDGrQqzg zmxg== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ0LJs6eLYurKOOXHwG+RZcjxHE4/Gpz80QmTMo2ApZGselcz9h1 lg1Ha4gjQpMjGfuOZFc5vtVM2se4w2FZ7CD3lCOuQA== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:1c4:: with SMTP id x4mr7731480oic.83.1584116144238; Fri, 13 Mar 2020 09:15:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200309190359.GA5822@paulmck-ThinkPad-P72> <20200309190420.6100-17-paulmck@kernel.org> <20200313085220.GC105953@debian-boqun.qqnc3lrjykvubdpftowmye0fmh.lx.internal.cloudapp.net> In-Reply-To: <20200313085220.GC105953@debian-boqun.qqnc3lrjykvubdpftowmye0fmh.lx.internal.cloudapp.net> From: Marco Elver Date: Fri, 13 Mar 2020 17:15:32 +0100 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH kcsan 17/32] kcsan: Introduce ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_* macros To: Boqun Feng Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" , LKML , kasan-dev , kernel-team@fb.com, Ingo Molnar , Andrey Konovalov , Alexander Potapenko , Dmitry Vyukov , Qian Cai Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 13 Mar 2020 at 09:52, Boqun Feng wrote: > > Hi Marco, > > On Mon, Mar 09, 2020 at 12:04:05PM -0700, paulmck@kernel.org wrote: > > From: Marco Elver > > > > Introduces ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER and ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS, which > > may be used to assert properties of synchronization logic, where > > violation cannot be detected as a normal data race. > > > > Examples of the reports that may be generated: > > > > ================================================================== > > BUG: KCSAN: assert: race in test_thread / test_thread > > > > write to 0xffffffffab3d1540 of 8 bytes by task 466 on cpu 2: > > test_thread+0x8d/0x111 > > debugfs_write.cold+0x32/0x44 > > ... > > > > assert no writes to 0xffffffffab3d1540 of 8 bytes by task 464 on cpu 0: > > test_thread+0xa3/0x111 > > debugfs_write.cold+0x32/0x44 > > ... > > ================================================================== > > > > ================================================================== > > BUG: KCSAN: assert: race in test_thread / test_thread > > > > assert no accesses to 0xffffffffab3d1540 of 8 bytes by task 465 on cpu 1: > > test_thread+0xb9/0x111 > > debugfs_write.cold+0x32/0x44 > > ... > > > > read to 0xffffffffab3d1540 of 8 bytes by task 464 on cpu 0: > > test_thread+0x77/0x111 > > debugfs_write.cold+0x32/0x44 > > ... > > ================================================================== > > > > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver > > Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney > > Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney > > --- > > include/linux/kcsan-checks.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h b/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h > > index 5dcadc2..cf69617 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h > > +++ b/include/linux/kcsan-checks.h > > @@ -96,4 +96,44 @@ static inline void kcsan_check_access(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, > > kcsan_check_access(ptr, size, KCSAN_ACCESS_ATOMIC | KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE) > > #endif > > > > +/** > > + * ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER - assert no other threads are writing @var > > + * > > + * Assert that there are no other threads writing @var; other readers are > > + * allowed. This assertion can be used to specify properties of concurrent code, > > + * where violation cannot be detected as a normal data race. > > + * > > I like the idea that we can assert no other writers, however I think > assertions like ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER() are a little limited. For > example, if we have the following code: > > preempt_disable(); > do_sth(); > raw_cpu_write(var, 1); > do_sth_else(); > preempt_enable(); > > we can add the assert to detect another potential writer like: > > preempt_disable(); > do_sth(); > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var); > raw_cpu_write(var, 1); > do_sth_else(); > preempt_enable(); > > , but, if I understand how KCSAN works correctly, it only works if the > another writer happens when the ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var) is called, > IOW, it can only detect another writer between do_sth() and > raw_cpu_write(). But our intent is to prevent other writers for the > whole preemption-off section. With this assertion introduced, people may > end up with code like: To confirm: KCSAN will detect a race if it sets up a watchpoint on ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var), and a concurrent write happens. Note that the watchpoints aren't always set up, but only periodically (discussed more below). For every watchpoint, we also inject an artificial delay. Pseudo-code: if watchpoint for access already set up { consume watchpoint; else if should set up watchpoint { setup watchpoint; udelay(...); check watchpoint consumed; release watchpoint; } > preempt_disable(); > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var); > do_sth(); > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var); > raw_cpu_write(var, 1); > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var); > do_sth_else(); > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var); > preempt_enable(); > > and that is horrible... It is, and I would strongly discourage any such use, because it's not necessary. See below. > So how about making a pair of annotations > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER_BEGIN() and ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER_END(), so > that we can write code like: > > preempt_disable(); > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER_BEGIN(var); > do_sth(); > raw_cpu_write(var, 1); > do_sth_else(); > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER_END(var); > preempt_enable(); > > ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER_BEGIN() could be a rough version of watchpoint > setting up and ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER_END() could be watchpoint > removing. So I think it's feasible. Keep in mind that the time from ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER_BEGIN to END might be on the order of a few nanosec, whereas KCSAN's default watchpoint delay is 10s of microsec (default ~80 for tasks). That means we would still have to set up a delay somewhere, and the few nanosec between BEGIN and END are insignificant and don't buy us anything. Re feasibility: Right now setting up and removing watchpoints is not exposed, and doing something like this would be an extremely intrusive change. Because of that, without being able to quantify the actual usefulness of this, and having evaluated better options (see below), I'd recommend not pursuing this. > Thoughts? Firstly, what is your objective? From what I gather you want to increase the probability of detecting a race with 'var'. I agree, and have been thinking about it, but there are other options that haven't been exhausted, before we go and make the interface more complicated. == Interface design == The interface as it is right now, is intuitive and using it is hard to get wrong. Demanding begin/end markers introduces complexity that will undoubtedly result in incorrect usage, because as soon as you somehow forget to end the region, you'll get tons of false positives. This may be due to control-flow that was missed etc. We had a similar problem with seqlocks, and getting them to work correctly with KCSAN was extremely difficult, because clear begin and end markers weren't always given. I imagine introducing an interface like this will ultimately result in similar problems, as much as we'd like to believe this won't ever happen. == Improving race detection for KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT access types == There are several options: 1. Always set up a watchpoint for assert-type accesses, and ignore KCSAN_SKIP_WATCH/kcsan_skip counter (see 'should_watch()'). One problem with this is that it would seriously impact overall performance as soon as we get a few ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_*() in a hot path somewhere. A compromise might be simply being more aggressive with setting up watchpoints on assert-type accesses. 2. Let's say in the above example (without BEGIN/END) the total duration (via udelay) of watchpoints for 'var' being set up is 4*D. Why not just increase the watchpoint delay for assert-type accesses to 4*D? Then, just having one ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var) somewhere in the region would have the same probability of catching a race. (Assuming that the region's remaining execution time is on the order of nanosecs.) I have some limited evidence that (1) is going to help, but not (2). This is based on experiments trying to reproduce racy use-after-free bugs that KASAN found, but with KCSAN. The problem is that it does slow-down overall system performance if in a hot path like an allocator. Which led me to a 3rd option. 3. Do option (1) but do the opposite of (2), i.e. always set up a watchpoint on assert-type accesses, but *reduce* the watchpoint delay. I haven't yet sent a patch for any one of 1-3 because I'm hesitant until we can actually show one of them would always be useful and improve things. For now, the best thing is to dynamically adjust udelay_{task,interrupt} and skip_watch either via Kconfig options or /sys/modules/kcsan/parameters/ and not add more complexity without good justification. A good stress test will also go a long way. There are some more (probably bad) ideas I have, but the above are the best options for now. So, anything that somehow increases the total time that a watchpoint is set up will increase the probability of detecting a race. However, we're also trying to balance overall system performance, as poor performance could equally affect race detection negatively (fewer instructions executed, etc.). Right now any one of 1-3 might sound like a decent idea, but I don't know what it will look like once we have dozens of ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_*() in places, especially if a few of them are in hot paths. Thanks, -- Marco > Regards, > Boqun > > > + * For example, if a per-CPU variable is only meant to be written by a single > > + * CPU, but may be read from other CPUs; in this case, reads and writes must be > > + * marked properly, however, if an off-CPU WRITE_ONCE() races with the owning > > + * CPU's WRITE_ONCE(), would not constitute a data race but could be a harmful > > + * race condition. Using this macro allows specifying this property in the code > > + * and catch such bugs. > > + * > > + * @var variable to assert on > > + */ > > +#define ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_WRITER(var) \ > > + __kcsan_check_access(&(var), sizeof(var), KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) > > + > > +/** > > + * ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS - assert no other threads are accessing @var > > + * > > + * Assert that no other thread is accessing @var (no readers nor writers). This > > + * assertion can be used to specify properties of concurrent code, where > > + * violation cannot be detected as a normal data race. > > + * > > + * For example, in a reference-counting algorithm where exclusive access is > > + * expected after the refcount reaches 0. We can check that this property > > + * actually holds as follows: > > + * > > + * if (refcount_dec_and_test(&obj->refcnt)) { > > + * ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS(*obj); > > + * safely_dispose_of(obj); > > + * } > > + * > > + * @var variable to assert on > > + */ > > +#define ASSERT_EXCLUSIVE_ACCESS(var) \ > > + __kcsan_check_access(&(var), sizeof(var), KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT) > > + > > #endif /* _LINUX_KCSAN_CHECKS_H */ > > -- > > 2.9.5 > >