Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
IronPort-SDR: Io92QD2bzhy6QoIKWRi2jdmavUtSQASwLI5/Gwfd7cGVyYszGMEeeB7MwvOWw5djPnXFbdd3JD
 n7W4WYHlb0qg==
IronPort-SDR: 0AVhMY1N7Bew7T72sRrIi/R0AJB7HLwB+oIbbsdRHG/yIZfELvtaMSTqUteyQOYCXWykJa7GT4
 Qr792+12M5Mg==
Date:   Wed, 18 Mar 2020 16:40:58 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
Cc:     Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
        dave.hansen@intel.com, Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>,
        "Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
        andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>, bp@alien8.de,
        Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>, luto@kernel.org,
        kai.huang@intel.com, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
        cedric.xing@intel.com, Patrick Uiterwijk <puiterwijk@redhat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>,
        Harald Hoyer <harald@redhat.com>,
        Lily Sturmann <lsturman@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v28 21/22] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX
 enclave call
Message-ID: <20200318234057.GE26164@linux.intel.com>
References: <20200303233609.713348-22-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
 <CAOASepPi4byhQ21hngsSx8tosCC-xa=y6r4j=pWo2MZGeyhi4Q@mail.gmail.com>
 <254f1e35-4302-e55f-c00d-0f91d9503498@fortanix.com>
 <CAOASepOm8-2UCdEnVMopEprMGWjkYUbUTX++dHaqCafi2ju8mA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20200313164622.GC5181@linux.intel.com>
 <CAOASepN1hxSgxVJAJiAbSmuCTCHd=95Mnvh6BKNSPJs=EpAmbQ@mail.gmail.com>
 <20200313184452.GD5181@linux.intel.com>
 <CAOASepP_oGOenjCvAvLg+e+=fz4H0X=cyD+v5ywD0peeXEEmYg@mail.gmail.com>
 <20200313220820.GE5181@linux.intel.com>
 <CAOASepMicT6CrYyDkoYizh4nAZ+1Zn4rGQh7QjfzSK72Fj6u_g@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <CAOASepMicT6CrYyDkoYizh4nAZ+1Zn4rGQh7QjfzSK72Fj6u_g@mail.gmail.com>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30)
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Sat, Mar 14, 2020 at 10:10:26AM -0400, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 13, 2020 at 6:08 PM Sean Christopherson
> <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> > > > > 4. sub/add to %rsp rather than save/restore
> > > >
> > > > Can you elaborate on why you want to sub/add to %rsp instead of having the
> > > > enclave unwind the stack?  Preserving %rsp across EEXIT/ERESUME seems more
> > > > in line with function call semantics, which I assume is desirable?  E.g.
> > > >
> > > >   push param3
> > > >   push param2
> > > >   push param1
> > > >
> > > >   enclu[EEXIT]
> > > >
> > > >   add $0x18, %rsp
> > >
> > > Before enclave EEXIT, the enclave restores %rsp to the value it had
> > > before EENTER was called. Then it pushes additional output arguments
> > > onto the stack. The enclave calls EENCLU[EEXIT].
> > >
> > > We are now in __vdso...() on the way back to the caller. However, %rsp
> > > has a different value than we entered the function with. This breaks
> > > x86_64 ABI, obviously. The handler needs to fix this up: how does it
> > > do so?

Circling back to this request, because I just realized that the above is
handled by saving %rsp into %rbp and requiring the enclave and handler
to preserve %rbp at all times.

So the below discussion on making the %rsp adjustment relative is moot,
at least with respect to getting out of __vdso() if the enclave has mucked
with the untrusted stack.

> > > In the current code, __vdso..() saves the value of %rsp, calls the
> > > handler and then restores %rsp. The handler can fix up the stack by
> > > setting the correct value to %rbx and returning without restoring it.
> >
> > Ah, you're referring to the patch where the handler decides to return all
> > the way back to the caller of __vdso...().
> >
> > > But this requires internal knowledge of the __vdso...() function,
> > > which could theoretically change in the future.
> > >
> > > If instead the __vdso...() only did add/sub, then the handler could do:
> > > 1. pop return address
> > > 2. pop handler stack params
> > > 3. pop enclave additional output stack params
> > > 4. push handler stack params
> > > 5. push return address

Per above, this is unnecessary when returning to the caller of __vdso().
It would be necessary if the enclave wasn't smart enough to do it's own
stack cleanup, but that seems like a very bizarre contract between the
enclave and its runtime.

The caveat is if %rbx is saved/restored by __vdso().  If we want a
traditional frame pointer, then %rbx would be restored from the stack
before %rsp itself is restored (from %rbp), in which case the exit handler
would need to adjust %rsp using a sequence similar to what you listed
above.

If __vdso() uses a non-standard frame pointer, e.g.

  push %rbp
  push %rbx
  mov  %rsp, %rbp

then %rbx would come off the stack after %rsp is restored from %rbp, i.e.
would be guaranteed to be restored to the pre-EENTER value (unless the
enclave or handler mucks with %rbp).

Anyways, we can discuss how to implement the frame pointer in the context
of the patches, just wanted to point this out here for completeness.

> > > While this is more work, it is standard calling convention work that
> > > doesn't require internal knowledge of __vdso..(). Alternatively, if we
> > > don't like the extra work, we can document the %rbx hack explicitly
> > > into the handler documentation and make it part of the interface. But
> > > we need some explicit way for the handler to pop enclave output stack
> > > params that doesn't depend on internal knowledge of the __vdso...()
> > > invariants.
> >
> > IIUC, this is what you're suggesting?  Having to align the stack makes this
> > a bit annoying, but it's not bad by any means.
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> > index 94a8e5f99961..05d54f79b557 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vsgx_enter_enclave.S
> > @@ -139,8 +139,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
> >         /* Pass the untrusted RSP (at exit) to the callback via %rcx. */
> >         mov     %rsp, %rcx
> >
> > -       /* Save the untrusted RSP in %rbx (non-volatile register). */
> > +       /* Save the untrusted RSP offset in %rbx (non-volatile register). */
> >         mov     %rsp, %rbx
> > +       and     $0xf, %rbx
> >
> >         /*
> >          * Align stack per x86_64 ABI. Note, %rsp needs to be 16-byte aligned
> > @@ -161,8 +162,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave)
> >         mov     0x20(%rbp), %rax
> >         call    .Lretpoline
> >
> > -       /* Restore %rsp to its post-exit value. */
> > -       mov     %rbx, %rsp
> > +       /* Undo the post-exit %rsp adjustment. */
> > +       lea     0x20(%rsp,%rbx), %rsp
> >
> >
> > That's reasonable, let's the handler play more games with minimal overhead.
> 
> Yes, exactly!
> 
> > > > > That would make this a very usable and fast interface without
> > > > > sacrificing any of its current power.
> > > >
> > >
> >
>