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Date:   Tue, 24 Mar 2020 13:00:52 +0100
From:   Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
To:     Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Cc:     Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>,
        linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org, Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: check caller of H_SVM_* Hcalls
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On Tue, 24 Mar 2020 10:43:23 +1100
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 01:22:48PM +0100, Greg Kurz wrote:
> > On Fri, 20 Mar 2020 11:26:42 +0100
> > Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > The Hcall named H_SVM_* are reserved to the Ultravisor. However, nothing
> > > prevent a malicious VM or SVM to call them. This could lead to weird result
> > > and should be filtered out.
> > > 
> > > Checking the Secure bit of the calling MSR ensure that the call is coming
> > > from either the Ultravisor or a SVM. But any system call made from a SVM
> > > are going through the Ultravisor, and the Ultravisor should filter out
> > > these malicious call. This way, only the Ultravisor is able to make such a
> > > Hcall.
> > 
> > "Ultravisor should filter" ? And what if it doesn't (eg. because of a bug) ?
> > 
> > Shouldn't we also check the HV bit of the calling MSR as well to
> > disambiguate SVM and UV ?
> 
> The trouble with doing that (checking the HV bit) is that KVM does not
> expect to see the HV bit set on an interrupt that occurred while we
> were in the guest, and if it is set, it indicates a serious problem,
> i.e. that an interrupt occurred while we were in the code that
> transitions from host context to guest context, or from guest context
> to host context.  In those cases we don't know how much of the
> transition has been completed and therefore whether we have guest
> values or host values in the CPU registers (GPRs, FPRs/VSRs, SPRs).
> If we do see HV set then KVM reports a severe error to userspace which
> should cause userspace to terminate the guest.
> 
> Therefore the UV should *always* have the HV bit clear in HSRR1/SRR1
> when transitioning to KVM.
> 

Indeed... thanks for the clarification. So I guess we'll just assume
that the UV doesn't reflect these SVM specific hcalls if they happened
to be issued by the guest then.

Cheers,

--
Greg

> Paul.