Received: by 2002:a25:6193:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id v141csp2340179ybb; Mon, 30 Mar 2020 04:26:59 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vuaFwzMIfJ3QjmXGEU+Dmz/weS5wkyHg0ToiX2u5c8eB2YOLfNedKMCWkmAMvU5C9+IhW8x X-Received: by 2002:a4a:4547:: with SMTP id y68mr8986981ooa.58.1585567618901; Mon, 30 Mar 2020 04:26:58 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1585567618; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=JyafuMtchKSEsluyaV7bI9bdwV5+ir8yg72ADNEkqj0i4Q0XPIUX/qbysUUvCWYgPe v7+ONt5ZVBuvXG30MOmt5Qg1uulOJRxVqZ09LnRsrV76pG1Yp3f1/Z9clBOlAdOcGEKc jpFOW84SFrvSBbb0wlvtwCSDOMgxy49DMfX/2CbOOybgb8I3lBa8qNzJZVnpI1eEdiIQ aPlClPmy8E6SXhW8PyFlVJg10gwlvI9o1UyHE2v+VKyYCkDQDAJCYmIGw9xBGmuZv2U9 Igqz3lA1e26912lLDDlSHv7Ydi3Px3UCCTrIjliwpk/OkVdP/wIpJT9Xt4q+WaOr0DW5 TTQQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:in-reply-to:content-disposition :mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc:to:from:date; bh=yVug2yXNxIZcPqRgQDy/Zjf2dP/l6WPBEgp6WPG6T3c=; b=UUcJvx1cuPS2r3qI9IcT9SyLxW4rChXYIeSyJwLRXAX9UnFJfS9gUmsesO+qUIHd99 pnAzlyjBN+Csqog0GxQ9eJqlraRWVM99oxJupTu1AoLBUYtGX5VM21PiYY0/4+fHzlUf BcuGU+ks/ioTmhymbtBb/KpKW8mLJs7Hkf/P3ZeCH5kKi2mUJ+fWmtU3UpOGIP0nxLnV OtqWcuXhU9hOnVLnPPEwAmfySXCRJd7gnXVpwRgRcq32vkRB+ikrvw8eU3dpaneU1vkR C6Sxnr2KyESmWwp4zN6gGe+av54NyNuBAfWYbRlaRc1jP7Ozj8c5Inlo/6l3PInynYn0 eMUw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id o14si6172119otl.122.2020.03.30.04.26.41; Mon, 30 Mar 2020 04:26:58 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729704AbgC3LZn (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 30 Mar 2020 07:25:43 -0400 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.110.172]:50766 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728764AbgC3LZm (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Mar 2020 07:25:42 -0400 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38EAE31B; Mon, 30 Mar 2020 04:25:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: from C02TD0UTHF1T.local (usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E626F3F52E; Mon, 30 Mar 2020 04:25:38 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 12:25:36 +0100 From: Mark Rutland To: Kees Cook Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Alexander Potapenko , Ard Biesheuvel , Jann Horn , "Perla, Enrico" , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Message-ID: <20200330112536.GD1309@C02TD0UTHF1T.local> References: <20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org> <20200324203231.64324-4-keescook@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200324203231.64324-4-keescook@chromium.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 01:32:29PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > +/* > + * Do not use this anywhere else in the kernel. This is used here because > + * it provides an arch-agnostic way to grow the stack with correct > + * alignment. Also, since this use is being explicitly masked to a max of > + * 10 bits, stack-clash style attacks are unlikely. For more details see > + * "VLAs" in Documentation/process/deprecated.rst > + */ > +void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size); > + > +#define add_random_kstack_offset() do { \ > + if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \ > + &randomize_kstack_offset)) { \ > + u32 offset = this_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \ > + char *ptr = __builtin_alloca(offset & 0x3FF); \ > + asm volatile("" : "=m"(*ptr)); \ Is this asm() a homebrew OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(*ptr)? If the asm constraints generate metter code, could we add those as alternative constraints in OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() ? Mark.