Received: by 2002:a17:90a:1609:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id n9csp840942pja; Wed, 1 Apr 2020 09:39:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APiQypK8UePny4Fkvbh1Sp+8w26V8KaIwaszUJK4Un+mdMXNmhgRTwIP3bY9FmP0ek+ExjGlk2Nn X-Received: by 2002:aca:c596:: with SMTP id v144mr3536359oif.136.1585759178670; Wed, 01 Apr 2020 09:39:38 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1585759178; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=iStZZ5CqwN94aQvo/e09Vz5kUhHhoXsP3LZBML9kMMEtFdGLxqfl0iik4+ndBR+UYx t71ZuHn/u5i9/Oa3BCHlAj4N7/9e095UJR1a7fXum7N1YwUBf9IUgbr6UiEyk+RfJi4p xjAtXi7F6AkOpjhsYhyNxgm4IYHAjQdf4cnFn/hr9bK+9ZJh5SVZqnrMawIbLiiD3YZT Oo+gMafAfIZMgVG6UvuFp6S4es2oz/WcFFFD8z72/Dkbw5HLYCT169aGrBesxvqywQ9z Xs7eIPZPCMrIKzLG0TWcCbCREsaNgYgiI8AfVK83Wu78gSEVWjHcu0K3H3THyEOPSTmZ K1rg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=9ScvJRTsJ937c9mUpWo1Jfpa3HrvjVJzX6PsorPNLzA=; b=Jd5BTt2qlpLV9St7OvXHyId/cQKYItRvBFGlJUlAcHlXt9N497OGDfWFqdGYpXogUq 2kE4WpfDnqvKOYspoMmoCRXSnbmTvFhJPRvhI3VnKayVz7hgyRlvgX0CwwQgY53b2a4c 8rZUCNxyDSKAQqRKA6orQFVE5zGY6yIsI8eIRd70UbSPJnNADs9iXgOqe4DxsSlN+4L3 zBYDZwbW22+nWzKbYH5v5UhZHOg5u3rPjYHB7gN1kYKy3iMS02IJbi826UtqfQDFtbQ5 NXuTz0JT8Dg8bM3575gKTFA3hm+XDtRs9XfaXR7k6muYkYWjgh60NgIgOGBhVTaNi8PG 6R0w== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=GqoPXYLu; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id w8si898570otg.26.2020.04.01.09.39.24; Wed, 01 Apr 2020 09:39:38 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=GqoPXYLu; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2389020AbgDAQhu (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 1 Apr 2020 12:37:50 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:37060 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2389009AbgDAQhq (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Apr 2020 12:37:46 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7D2A1212CC; Wed, 1 Apr 2020 16:37:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1585759066; bh=tmjogg9yI+Opax21DufBCCunzR9HJWzo5dAUBKQVx3A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=GqoPXYLutnEx4H+3tTW7sm6Tvn5+/T6iuvKZMcgNdGnOe0Q+K+nPtOCMMoNLim2EX 1FeMBK1b1OgAh1JxqOfkeXOQ8nNNgoeB13EBRoYjWlE9Busb3WKtoDsNPo6cmL3Vn+ mbCymu5aYos0mChyS2MVLEoUxwUtFhhO/YJQHKLE= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Xin Long , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 4.9 066/102] xfrm: fix uctx len check in verify_sec_ctx_len Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 18:18:09 +0200 Message-Id: <20200401161543.863244296@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.0 In-Reply-To: <20200401161530.451355388@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200401161530.451355388@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Xin Long commit 171d449a028573b2f0acdc7f31ecbb045391b320 upstream. It's not sufficient to do 'uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) + uctx->ctx_len)' check only, as uctx->len may be greater than nla_len(rt), in which case it will cause slab-out-of-bounds when accessing uctx->ctx_str later. This patch is to fix it by return -EINVAL when uctx->len > nla_len(rt). Fixes: df71837d5024 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ static inline int verify_sec_ctx_len(str return 0; uctx = nla_data(rt); - if (uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) + uctx->ctx_len)) + if (uctx->len > nla_len(rt) || + uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) + uctx->ctx_len)) return -EINVAL; return 0;