Received: by 2002:a17:90a:1609:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id n9csp850728pja; Wed, 1 Apr 2020 09:49:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APiQypKLGqnK+GdlL3usrmLuEHMca5pRiN8kYpvxiplfAE0yzn7EUdRgCojH58Eb4f2vyFeFHn/3 X-Received: by 2002:aca:cc0c:: with SMTP id c12mr3542475oig.6.1585759796697; Wed, 01 Apr 2020 09:49:56 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1585759796; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=yPf6a3dQ1Bat/nx7L8ccbhywLhnPvdDncltCAP5hfsrWqqlwxs2qSw26C33gQ/bB6l ccJ3kaDYHpuRvzCk6NbSOxIOGsb85bDUBOWO/8CRUrbjMwYQYe8R/7bJCJnbPrFe6f/M p6aH2DfwixwISZRg7bIOFbJCLinjrZhI23mMb2CN+0AtPG/nMmAGAZLeidck7GBMRycb 1d4Uz4k88vARJ/qasVcG/NBEHgKYYZ9DMQV+J2R+nZwlu7Nyd50ngnHe4sprBOeSxyHQ QNYnV3c7bIVB5yxQFRV9Hl/VWbYEeGv3HusdfkRNJb5TJQV3G12/2IqPmqhR/QuUIQjG 9qtw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=9ScvJRTsJ937c9mUpWo1Jfpa3HrvjVJzX6PsorPNLzA=; b=hkD43e9QdGidYcR0PoY9mJbIUQSM/8Crhvcp5GmO7MKNwMyOjFK2LzFgqoC+dflLa3 QWZUYn0TNt1PU+RkTk+y/stQglhy/c+9082AQVqCVsfhIbm7e3HdgpVjSt82e6/eeaVD UUfkomB2hYJzcSQpvQxmeWUHtmTltralaCg0GdFWzA9hGKZ9sZuulc7JIt9GJRTjTLxL l+SmaOs7iFxAD3mIVJgxkT+XrgLayYg63DB55Woqz/W0PO0N9xKfEmmbfw07zpnOkFy9 rsGjizG8EWfXPkc5+HtBaKwW0N/J42GP7AKS8VFSz8wqllw4T0q6/rDUiLf9lTxrEN+5 jZVA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=spGJ8Lgh; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id u3si1005300otq.177.2020.04.01.09.49.43; Wed, 01 Apr 2020 09:49:56 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=spGJ8Lgh; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732793AbgDAQpd (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 1 Apr 2020 12:45:33 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:46658 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2389263AbgDAQpZ (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Apr 2020 12:45:25 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B0A7420719; Wed, 1 Apr 2020 16:45:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1585759525; bh=tmjogg9yI+Opax21DufBCCunzR9HJWzo5dAUBKQVx3A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=spGJ8LghqhePhHshgIIrpPJQ420nZ3GN5Pjr/io0lSLzY4RzkU2Y0ZSOvQ3eEkhSy 9xdKUJz+UOtFNaZLpH/Yj+vXUHJai38pIocMd/ib7RANlBtsDHwk98n4KJeY9P+pJU J+sCcSGEqy2m8BbEE7oLRYfMXw4dyIj+kEWByQAA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Xin Long , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 4.14 106/148] xfrm: fix uctx len check in verify_sec_ctx_len Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 18:18:18 +0200 Message-Id: <20200401161602.856868152@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.0 In-Reply-To: <20200401161552.245876366@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200401161552.245876366@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Xin Long commit 171d449a028573b2f0acdc7f31ecbb045391b320 upstream. It's not sufficient to do 'uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) + uctx->ctx_len)' check only, as uctx->len may be greater than nla_len(rt), in which case it will cause slab-out-of-bounds when accessing uctx->ctx_str later. This patch is to fix it by return -EINVAL when uctx->len > nla_len(rt). Fixes: df71837d5024 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.") Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ static inline int verify_sec_ctx_len(str return 0; uctx = nla_data(rt); - if (uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) + uctx->ctx_len)) + if (uctx->len > nla_len(rt) || + uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) + uctx->ctx_len)) return -EINVAL; return 0;