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Date:   Thu, 2 Apr 2020 15:13:28 -0500
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To:     Balbir Singh <sblbir@amazon.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
        tony.luck@intel.com, keescook@chromium.org, x86@kernel.org,
        benh@kernel.crashing.org, dave.hansen@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] arch/x86: Optionally flush L1D on context switch
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On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 05:23:58PM +1100, Balbir Singh wrote:
> Provide a mechanisn to flush the L1D cache on context switch.  The goal
> is to allow tasks that are paranoid due to the recent snoop assisted data
> sampling vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out.

Hi Balbir,

Just curious, is it really vulnerabilities, plural?  I thought there was
only one: CVE-2020-0550 (Snoop-assisted L1 Data Sampling).

(There was a similar one without the "snoop": L1D Eviction Sampling, but
it's supposed to get fixed in microcode).

-- 
Josh