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From:   Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Date:   Thu, 2 Apr 2020 16:18:01 -0700
Message-ID: <CALMp9eSgKQW=rVnBq26cjNfcDXv2BWeA47oHM5pyQke7RpGykw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] KVM: VMX: Extend VMX's #AC interceptor to handle
 split lock #AC in guest
To:     "Kenneth R. Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>
Cc:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
        Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        x86 <x86@kernel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
        Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
        Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
        Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Doug Covelli <dcovelli@vmware.com>
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On Thu, Apr 2, 2020 at 4:16 PM Kenneth R. Crudup <kenny@panix.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, 2 Apr 2020, Steven Rostedt wrote:
>
> > If we go the approach of not letting VM modules load if it doesn't have the
> > sld_safe flag set, how is this different than a VM module not loading due
> > to kabi breakage?
>
> Why not a compromise: if such a module is attempted to be loaded, print up
> a message saying something akin to "turn the parameter 'split_lock_detect'
> off" as we reject loading it- and if we see that we've booted with it off
> just splat a WARN_ON() if someone tries to load such modules?

What modules are we talking about? I thought we were discussing L1
hypervisors, which are just binary blobs. The only modules at the L0
level are kvm and kvm_intel.