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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id v128si682190oig.68.2020.04.07.07.36.27; Tue, 07 Apr 2020 07:36:42 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=vw+fi1YI; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729261AbgDGOfq (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 7 Apr 2020 10:35:46 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:51164 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729103AbgDGOfq (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Apr 2020 10:35:46 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 14F4E2072A; Tue, 7 Apr 2020 14:35:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1586270145; bh=uUUfBlLBVmrI407h4iuq4K2XwW9Hz2vHNDOeF14Nv1E=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=vw+fi1YImMQ/v+btFUxWr/B8BtnaY6U61zM5JzUTZ02m5OSJMk6fNH1TIeeHd1sSo JOMoMBZUi7+Ulp+tvVyGMKYlySrU6hRcJ7pbzG8mVo7hi/3CFxSB/1RHbZ9+JRczq2 z9xcQS8o6fd8T8DRmV1i+xOPgJ3VrQ7f6W+i5iWI= Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2020 16:35:43 +0200 From: Greg KH To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, hch@infradead.org, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, kenny@panix.com, jeyu@kernel.org, rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk, pbonzini@redhat.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com, nadav.amit@gmail.com, thellstrom@vmware.com, tony.luck@intel.com, rostedt@goodmis.org, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org, David.Laight@aculab.com, dcovelli@vmware.com, mhiramat@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts Message-ID: <20200407143543.GB876345@kroah.com> References: <20200407110236.930134290@infradead.org> <20200407111007.352324393@infradead.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200407111007.352324393@infradead.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 01:02:39PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > It turns out that with Split-Lock-Detect enabled (default) any VMX > hypervisor needs at least a little modification in order to not blindly > inject the #AC into the guest without the guest being ready for it. > > Since there is no telling which module implements a hypervisor, scan > all out-of-tree modules' text and look for VMX instructions and refuse > to load it when SLD is enabled (default) and the module isn't marked > 'sld_safe'. > > Hypervisors, which have been modified and are known to work correctly, > can add: > > MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y"); > > to explicitly tell the module loader they're good. What's to keep any out-of-tree module from adding this same module info "flag" and just lie about it? Isn't that what you are trying to catch here, or is it a case of, "if you lie, your code will break" as well? thanks, greg k-h