Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
Date:   Wed, 8 Apr 2020 10:51:38 +0200
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To:     Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Cc:     Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, tglx@linutronix.de,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, hch@infradead.org,
        sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
        hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, kenny@panix.com, jeyu@kernel.org,
        rasmus.villemoes@prevas.dk, pbonzini@redhat.com,
        fenghua.yu@intel.com, xiaoyao.li@intel.com, nadav.amit@gmail.com,
        thellstrom@vmware.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
        gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, jannh@google.com,
        keescook@chromium.org, David.Laight@aculab.com,
        dcovelli@vmware.com, mhiramat@kernel.org,
        Wolfgang Mauerer <wolfgang.mauerer@oth-regensburg.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] x86,module: Detect CRn and DRn manipulation
Message-ID: <20200408085138.GQ20713@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
References: <20200407110236.930134290@infradead.org>
 <20200407111007.429362016@infradead.org>
 <20200407174824.5e97a597@gandalf.local.home>
 <137fe245-69f3-080e-5f2b-207cd218f199@siemens.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <137fe245-69f3-080e-5f2b-207cd218f199@siemens.com>
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, Apr 08, 2020 at 07:58:53AM +0200, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> On 07.04.20 23:48, Steven Rostedt wrote:

> > Hmm, wont this break jailhouse?

Breaking it isn't a problem, it's out of tree and it should be fixable.

> Yes, possibly. We load the hypervisor binary via request_firmware into
> executable memory and then jump into it. So most of the "suspicious" code is

W.T.H. does the firmware loader have the ability to give executable
memory? We need to kill that too. /me goes find.