Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932619AbWCAHze (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Mar 2006 02:55:34 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S932621AbWCAHze (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Mar 2006 02:55:34 -0500 Received: from 216-99-217-87.dsl.aracnet.com ([216.99.217.87]:59011 "EHLO sorel.sous-sol.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932619AbWCAHzd (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Mar 2006 02:55:33 -0500 Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 23:59:15 -0800 From: Chris Wright To: Kyle Moffett Cc: Hauke Laging , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: VFS: Dynamic umask for the access rights of linked objects Message-ID: <20060301075915.GD27645@sorel.sous-sol.org> References: <200603010328.42008.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de> <44050AB7.7020202@vilain.net> <200603010454.15223.mailinglisten@hauke-laging.de> <08AB14CC-2BB2-4923-BFDB-B1360B5EF405@mac.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <08AB14CC-2BB2-4923-BFDB-B1360B5EF405@mac.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2.1i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1438 Lines: 30 * Kyle Moffett (mrmacman_g4@mac.com) wrote: > On Feb 28, 2006, at 22:54:15, Hauke Laging wrote: > >6) In my scenario the VFS would add a step after 4): It would check > >if the symlink has been created by someone different from the > >process's uid and from root. If so there is the risk of abuse and > >the access check would be repeated for the symlink owner. > > > >7) The VFS would find out that the symlink owner is not allowed to > >write to /etc/passwd. Thus the write access is prohibited, even for > >a process with superuser rights. > > Feel free to write an LSM to do this, but it breaks POSIX specs a bit > and could cause problems with some programs, so it's not likely to > become the default behavior. Solar Designer's Openwall Linux patch contains code for these types of restrictions (at least since 2.2 if not earlier). Idea was stolen and made into an LSM smth like 4 or 5 years ago. Neither of these have made it upstream. Attempts have also been made to codify such restrictions in SELinux policy. Polyinstantiation and per-process namespaces can be done effectively with code that's now in mainline, and can mitigate much of this risk. thanks, -chris - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/