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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id c3si3581983ejr.452.2020.04.22.05.50.10; Wed, 22 Apr 2020 05:50:33 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=SWIJTMC4; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730435AbgDVKYg (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 22 Apr 2020 06:24:36 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:60422 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730385AbgDVKXw (ORCPT ); Wed, 22 Apr 2020 06:23:52 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A77DB2076B; Wed, 22 Apr 2020 10:23:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1587551032; bh=dgsp2o5jhO3cVaLbl6yI7GcuL8xJF4PWHyAwkSBbIFo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SWIJTMC45aiQN/C16lNhDB751ePEr9LYUCf215Lia9A4gOvgyzQlhF663a9jENkFO ewybp+7I3jG2aQ4WSWpqvXNNzZIP9VIhLHgiaYkYwoROKkZ6dslYU6zjhB2yynIdCP cqsxOEjn17J3hhBoIMK4y/cRH6D+6kBY0GEAgBtE= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Bui Quang Minh , Magnus Karlsson , Daniel Borkmann Subject: [PATCH 5.6 020/166] xsk: Add missing check on user supplied headroom size Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2020 11:55:47 +0200 Message-Id: <20200422095050.640912048@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200422095047.669225321@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200422095047.669225321@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Magnus Karlsson commit 99e3a236dd43d06c65af0a2ef9cb44306aef6e02 upstream. Add a check that the headroom cannot be larger than the available space in the chunk. In the current code, a malicious user can set the headroom to a value larger than the chunk size minus the fixed XDP headroom. That way packets with a length larger than the supported size in the umem could get accepted and result in an out-of-bounds write. Fixes: c0c77d8fb787 ("xsk: add user memory registration support sockopt") Reported-by: Bui Quang Minh Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207225 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1586849715-23490-1-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xdp/xdp_umem.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c +++ b/net/xdp/xdp_umem.c @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem u32 chunk_size = mr->chunk_size, headroom = mr->headroom; unsigned int chunks, chunks_per_page; u64 addr = mr->addr, size = mr->len; - int size_chk, err; + int err; if (chunk_size < XDP_UMEM_MIN_CHUNK_SIZE || chunk_size > PAGE_SIZE) { /* Strictly speaking we could support this, if: @@ -382,8 +382,7 @@ static int xdp_umem_reg(struct xdp_umem return -EINVAL; } - size_chk = chunk_size - headroom - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM; - if (size_chk < 0) + if (headroom >= chunk_size - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM) return -EINVAL; umem->address = (unsigned long)addr;