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Date:   Wed, 22 Apr 2020 17:26:31 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY
From:   Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
To:     Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
        Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>,
        Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>,
        Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
        Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>, Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>,
        linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, timmurray@google.com,
        minchan@google.com, sspatil@google.com, lokeshgidra@google.com
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Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
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userfaultfd handles page faults from both user and kernel code.  Add a
new UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY flag for userfaultfd(2) that makes the
resulting userfaultfd object refuse to handle faults from kernel mode,
treating these faults as if SIGBUS were always raised, causing the
kernel code to fail with EFAULT.

A future patch adds a knob allowing administrators to give some
processes the ability to create userfaultfd file objects only if they
pass UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY, reducing the likelihood that these processes
will exploit userfaultfd's ability to delay kernel page faults to open
timing windows for future exploits.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
---
 fs/userfaultfd.c                 | 7 ++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index e39fdec8a0b0..21378abe8f7b 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -418,6 +418,9 @@ vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fault *vmf, unsigned long reason)
 
 	if (ctx->features & UFFD_FEATURE_SIGBUS)
 		goto out;
+	if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER) == 0 &&
+	    ctx->flags & UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY)
+		goto out;
 
 	/*
 	 * If it's already released don't get it. This avoids to loop
@@ -2003,6 +2006,7 @@ static void init_once_userfaultfd_ctx(void *mem)
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
 {
+	static const int uffd_flags = UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY;
 	struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
 	int fd;
 
@@ -2012,10 +2016,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
 	BUG_ON(!current->mm);
 
 	/* Check the UFFD_* constants for consistency.  */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(uffd_flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(UFFD_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(UFFD_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
 
-	if (flags & ~UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS)
+	if (flags & ~(UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS | uffd_flags))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ctx = kmem_cache_alloc(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
index e7e98bde221f..5f2d88212f7c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
@@ -257,4 +257,13 @@ struct uffdio_writeprotect {
 	__u64 mode;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Flags for the userfaultfd(2) system call itself.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Create a userfaultfd that can handle page faults only in user mode.
+ */
+#define UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY 1
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_USERFAULTFD_H */
-- 
2.26.2.303.gf8c07b1a785-goog