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From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@linux-foundation.org, Denis Kirjanov <kda@linux-powerpc.org>,
        "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
        "Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
        "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
        "Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 24 Apr 2020 00:07:22 +0100
Message-ID: <lsq.1587683028.379768933@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 215/245] staging: android: ashmem: Disallow ashmem
 memory from being remapped
In-Reply-To: <lsq.1587683027.831233700@decadent.org.uk>
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

3.16.83-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>

commit 6d67b0290b4b84c477e6a2fc6e005e174d3c7786 upstream.

When ashmem file is mmapped, the resulting vma->vm_file points to the
backing shmem file with the generic fops that do not check ashmem
permissions like fops of ashmem do. If an mremap is done on the ashmem
region, then the permission checks will be skipped. Fix that by disallowing
mapping operation on the backing shmem file.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200127235616.48920-1-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
 drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -351,8 +351,23 @@ static inline vm_flags_t calc_vm_may_fla
 	       _calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_EXEC,  VM_MAYEXEC);
 }
 
+static int ashmem_vmfile_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	/* do not allow to mmap ashmem backing shmem file directly */
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+ashmem_vmfile_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff,
+				unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+}
+
 static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
+	static struct file_operations vmfile_fops;
 	struct ashmem_area *asma = file->private_data;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -386,6 +401,19 @@ static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file
 			goto out;
 		}
 		asma->file = vmfile;
+		/*
+		 * override mmap operation of the vmfile so that it can't be
+		 * remapped which would lead to creation of a new vma with no
+		 * asma permission checks. Have to override get_unmapped_area
+		 * as well to prevent VM_BUG_ON check for f_ops modification.
+		 */
+		if (!vmfile_fops.mmap) {
+			vmfile_fops = *vmfile->f_op;
+			vmfile_fops.mmap = ashmem_vmfile_mmap;
+			vmfile_fops.get_unmapped_area =
+					ashmem_vmfile_get_unmapped_area;
+		}
+		vmfile->f_op = &vmfile_fops;
 	}
 	get_file(asma->file);