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To:     Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc:     Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        "selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
From:   Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
Organization: Intel Corp.
Message-ID: <0fffd9e2-1f22-a0c2-c2e3-cb7f4bb89d66@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 30 Apr 2020 10:06:09 +0300
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Changes in v3:
- mention "CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN" instead of sole CAP_PERFMON or 
  CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the docs and messages to support use case
  of newer Perf tool on kernel w/o CAP_PERFMON
- reverted double new line in "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n"
- updated security.txt content with new messages wording

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/66f2975b-4a69-b428-7dc5-d9aa40b3c673@linux.intel.com/

Changes in v2:
- implemented minor doc and code changes to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN
  with CAP_PERFMON capability;
- introduced Perf doc file with instructions on how to enable and use
  perf_event LSM hooks for mandatory access control to perf_event_open()
  syscall;

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b8a0669e-36e4-a0e8-fd35-3dbd890d2170@linux.intel.com/

repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux.git perf/core
sha1: ee097e8ee56f8867cbbf45fe2a06f6b9e660c39c


Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify 
in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced 
SELinux policy settings. See new added security.txt file for exact steps
how the changes look like and how to test the patch set.

---
Alexey Budankov (3):
  perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed
  perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
  perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues

 tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt |   2 +-
 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt      | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/perf/util/cloexec.c                  |   4 +-
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c                    |  39 ++--
 4 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt

-- 
2.24.1