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Date:   Mon, 04 May 2020 11:57:38 -0700 (PDT)
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Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: stmmac: gmac5+: fix potential integer overflow on
 32 bit multiply
From:   David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In-Reply-To: <20200501141016.290699-1-colin.king@canonical.com>
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From: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Date: Fri,  1 May 2020 15:10:16 +0100

> From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> 
> The multiplication of cfg->ctr[1] by 1000000000 is performed using a
> 32 bit multiplication (since cfg->ctr[1] is a u32) and this can lead
> to a potential overflow. Fix this by making the constant a ULL to
> ensure a 64 bit multiply occurs.
> 
> Fixes: 504723af0d85 ("net: stmmac: Add basic EST support for GMAC5+")
> Addresses-Coverity: ("Unintentional integer overflow")
> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>

Applied.