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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id c11si911752ejs.396.2020.05.06.04.02.23; Wed, 06 May 2020 04:02:48 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728581AbgEFITf (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 6 May 2020 04:19:35 -0400 Received: from mga12.intel.com ([192.55.52.136]:35417 "EHLO mga12.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727956AbgEFITe (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2020 04:19:34 -0400 IronPort-SDR: wntHLFj6rg0wg0HqOk2jDwPkZOLL3MqNXsEDYhgQB9X4wlAj45cSXpneSdFfF89T2FcBaJtLmL AvXTKYwNobXQ== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga003.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.27]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 06 May 2020 01:19:33 -0700 IronPort-SDR: R0C9Sc5VvEfUbYBxqCRzJrxaZDUKqjptSRqN2RcQq7g2BYiXDU4po4bD/6AHc2YIoDZ/jVQA/B fbFVy7OA8Unw== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.73,358,1583222400"; d="scan'208";a="260030066" Received: from unknown (HELO local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com) ([10.239.159.128]) by orsmga003.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 06 May 2020 01:19:31 -0700 From: Yang Weijiang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, jmattson@google.com Cc: yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com, Yang Weijiang Subject: [PATCH v12 01/10] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and flags Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 16:21:00 +0800 Message-Id: <20200506082110.25441-2-weijiang.yang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.2 In-Reply-To: <20200506082110.25441-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> References: <20200506082110.25441-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org CET(Control-flow Enforcement Technology) is a CPU feature used to prevent Return/Jump-Oriented Programming(ROP/JOP) attacks. It provides the following sub-features to defend against ROP/JOP style control-flow subversion attacks: Shadow Stack (SHSTK): A second stack for program which is used exclusively for control transfer operations. Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT): Code branching protection to defend against jump/call oriented programming. Several new CET MSRs are defined in kernel to support CET: MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET: Controls the CET settings for user mode and kernel mode respectively. MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointers for CPL-0,1,2,3 protection respectively. MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB: Stores base address of shadow stack pointer table. Two XSAVES state bits are introduced for CET: IA32_XSS:[bit 11]: Control saving/restoring user mode CET states IA32_XSS:[bit 12]: Control saving/restoring kernel mode CET states. Six VMCS fields are introduced for CET: {HOST,GUEST}_S_CET: Stores CET settings for kernel mode. {HOST,GUEST}_SSP: Stores shadow stack pointer of current task/thread. {HOST,GUEST}_INTR_SSP_TABLE: Stores base address of shadow stack pointer table. If VM_EXIT_LOAD_HOST_CET_STATE = 1, the host CET states are restored from below VMCS fields at VM-Exit: HOST_S_CET HOST_SSP HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE If VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_CET_STATE = 1, the guest CET states are loaded from below VMCS fields at VM-Entry: GUEST_S_CET GUEST_SSP GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang --- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h index 5e090d1f03f8..f301def9125a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS 0x00800000 #define VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x01000000 #define VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x02000000 +#define VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE 0x10000000 #define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x00036dff @@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS 0x00010000 #define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP 0x00020000 #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00040000 +#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE 0x00100000 #define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR 0x000011ff @@ -328,6 +330,9 @@ enum vmcs_field { GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS = 0x00006822, GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP = 0x00006824, GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006826, + GUEST_S_CET = 0x00006828, + GUEST_SSP = 0x0000682a, + GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x0000682c, HOST_CR0 = 0x00006c00, HOST_CR3 = 0x00006c02, HOST_CR4 = 0x00006c04, @@ -340,6 +345,9 @@ enum vmcs_field { HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP = 0x00006c12, HOST_RSP = 0x00006c14, HOST_RIP = 0x00006c16, + HOST_S_CET = 0x00006c18, + HOST_SSP = 0x00006c1a, + HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE = 0x00006c1c }; /* -- 2.17.2