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From:   Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Date:   Wed, 6 May 2020 11:36:49 -0700
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Subject: Re: [GRUB PATCH RFC 12/18] i386/efi: Report UEFI Secure Boot status
 to the Linux kernel
To:     Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc:     The development of GNU GRUB <grub-devel@gnu.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
        alexander.burmashev@oracle.com,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
        eric.snowberg@oracle.com,
        Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>,
        kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
        krystian.hebel@3mdeb.com, lukasz.hawrylko@linux.intel.com,
        michal.zygowski@3mdeb.com,
        "Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko" <phcoder@gmail.com>,
        pirot.krol@3mdeb.com, Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>,
        Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
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On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 6:33 AM Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:29:05AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 4:25 PM Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various
> > > security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot.
> >
> > I think this needs more context. If the kernel is loaded via the EFI
> > boot stub, the kernel is aware of the UEFI secure boot state. Why
> > duplicate this functionality in order to avoid the EFI stub?
>
> It seems to me that this issue was discussed here [1] and here [2].
> So, if you want me to improve the commit message I am OK with that.

Yes, I think just providing an explanation for why it's currently
necessary for you to duplicate this is reasonable.