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Date:   Sat, 9 May 2020 11:59:10 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To:     Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] kernel: add panic_on_taint
Message-ID: <202005091159.A317BEFF@keescook>
References: <20200509135737.622299-1-aquini@redhat.com>
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On Sat, May 09, 2020 at 09:57:37AM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch
> introduces a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to
> provide a simple and generic way to stop execution and catch
> a coredump when the kernel gets tainted by any given taint flag.
> 
> This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids rebuilding
> the kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() or BUG() into
> code sites that introduce the taint flags of interest.
> Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
> 
> Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
> Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-- 
Kees Cook