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From:   ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>,
        Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>,
        Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>,
        linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
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Date:   Sat, 09 May 2020 15:12:22 -0500
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wj-Znzqp3xktZ+kERM5cKF-Yh_6XjyGYof6bqPq2T3F5A@mail.gmail.com>
        (Linus Torvalds's message of "Sat, 9 May 2020 13:07:48 -0700")
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] exec: Directly call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file
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Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> writes:

> On Sat, May 9, 2020 at 12:44 PM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>>
>> Now that security_bprm_set_creds is no longer responsible for calling
>> cap_bprm_set_creds, security_bprm_set_creds only does something for
>> the primary file that is being executed (not any interpreters it may
>> have).  Therefore call security_bprm_set_creds from __do_execve_file,
>> instead of from prepare_binprm so that it is only called once, and
>> remove the now unnecessary called_set_creds field of struct binprm.
>
> Ahh, good, this patch removes the 'called_set_creds' logic from the
> security subsystems.
>
> So it does half of what I asked for: please also just rename that
> "security_bprm_set_creds()" to be "security_primary_bprm_set_creds()"
> so that the change of semantics also shows up that way.
>
> And so that there is no confusion about the fact that
> "cap_bprm_set_creds()" has absolutely nothing to do with
> "security_bprm_set_creds()" any more.

I agree something needs to be renamed, to remove confusion.

I am off for a nap now, and tomorrow is Mother's day so I probably won't
be back to this seriously until Monday.  But please disect these patches
and I will address any problems.

Eric