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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id u10si5241901ejt.145.2020.05.10.21.55.21; Sun, 10 May 2020 21:55:49 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=kE7nLAOH; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728531AbgEKExj (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 11 May 2020 00:53:39 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:37532 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728466AbgEKExh (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 May 2020 00:53:37 -0400 Received: from sasha-vm.mshome.net (c-73-47-72-35.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.47.72.35]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 65D072495A; Mon, 11 May 2020 04:53:35 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589172816; bh=SE4H3rs5xDsluoQiEsFpV2XAECioMoEb6Gv+LNpyQ+E=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=kE7nLAOH20FEpKKWCHKTRR1JZ06Qe8Fole5zBGZwCqYcbjM0Y1lUK9TNfGpuNX4KC xNnENoDfEQrKhPYSAqcypITL2x3OrtEtQQF8bzu7DquhjMQ0Ls4jF9MbTpOUtuS/6x /eczMEVvdrr/W4r0nYzzQN5UkhlHgOlJ4SE8ihsQ= From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, chang.seok.bae@intel.com, Sasha Levin , Tom Lendacky , Vegard Nossum Subject: [PATCH v12 07/18] x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 00:53:00 -0400 Message-Id: <20200511045311.4785-8-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20200511045311.4785-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20200511045311.4785-1-sashal@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Chang S. Bae" Without FSGSBASE, user space cannot change GS base other than through a PRCTL. The kernel enforces that the user space GS base value is positive as negative values are used for detecting the kernel space GS base value in the paranoid entry code. If FSGSBASE is enabled, user space can set arbitrary GS base values without kernel intervention, including negative ones, which breaks the paranoid entry assumptions. To avoid this, paranoid entry needs to unconditionally save the current GS base value independent of the interrupted context, retrieve and write the kernel GS base and unconditionally restore the saved value on exit. The restore happens either in paranoid exit or in the special exit path of the NMI low level code. All other entry code paths which use unconditional SWAPGS are not affected as they do not depend on the actual content. The new logic for paranoid entry, when FSGSBASE is enabled, removes SWAPGS and replaces with unconditional WRGSBASE. Hence no fences are needed. Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Reviewed-by: Tony Luck Acked-by: Tom Lendacky Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Tony Luck Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Vegard Nossum --- arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h index 29982fe140541..6dc2702a939c7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h @@ -342,6 +342,12 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with #endif .endm +.macro SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg:req save_reg:req + rdgsbase \save_reg + GET_PERCPU_BASE \scratch_reg + wrgsbase \scratch_reg +.endm + #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ .macro STACKLEAK_ERASE diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 3ac1313724eaa..c2c4e063c406d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "calling.h" @@ -1211,9 +1212,14 @@ idtentry machine_check do_mce has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 #endif /* - * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch gs if needed. - * Use slow, but surefire "are we in kernel?" check. - * Return: ebx=0: need swapgs on exit, ebx=1: otherwise + * Save all registers in pt_regs. Return GS base related information + * in EBX depending on the availability of the FSGSBASE instructions: + * + * FSGSBASE R/EBX + * N 0 -> SWAPGS on exit + * 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit + * + * Y GS base value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) UNWIND_HINT_FUNC @@ -1238,7 +1244,29 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) */ SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14 - /* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */ + /* + * Handling GS base depends on the availability of FSGSBASE. + * + * Without FSGSBASE the kernel enforces that negative GS base + * values indicate kernel GS base. With FSGSBASE no assumptions + * can be made about the GS base value when entering from user + * space. + */ + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE + + /* + * Read the current GS base and store it in %rbx unconditionally, + * retrieve and set the current CPUs kernel GS base. The stored value + * has to be restored in paranoid_exit unconditionally. + * + * This unconditional write of GS base ensures no subsequent load + * based on a mispredicted GS base. + */ + SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx + ret + +.Lparanoid_entry_checkgs: + /* EBX = 1 -> kernel GS base active, no restore required */ movl $1, %ebx /* * The kernel-enforced convention is a negative GS base indicates @@ -1265,10 +1293,17 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * * We may be returning to very strange contexts (e.g. very early * in syscall entry), so checking for preemption here would - * be complicated. Fortunately, we there's no good reason - * to try to handle preemption here. + * be complicated. Fortunately, there's no good reason to try + * to handle preemption here. + * + * R/EBX contains the GS base related information depending on the + * availability of the FSGSBASE instructions: + * + * FSGSBASE R/EBX + * N 0 -> SWAPGS on exit + * 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit * - * On entry, ebx is "no swapgs" flag (1: don't need swapgs, 0: need it) + * Y User space GS base, must be restored unconditionally */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) UNWIND_HINT_REGS @@ -1285,7 +1320,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) TRACE_IRQS_OFF_DEBUG RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14 - /* If EBX is 0, SWAPGS is required */ + /* Handle the three GS base cases */ + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_exit_checkgs", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE + + /* With FSGSBASE enabled, unconditionally resotre GS base */ + wrgsbase %rbx + jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel + +.Lparanoid_exit_checkgs: + /* On non-FSGSBASE systems, conditionally do SWAPGS */ testl %ebx, %ebx jnz restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel @@ -1699,10 +1742,27 @@ end_repeat_nmi: /* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */ RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14 - testl %ebx, %ebx /* swapgs needed? */ + /* + * The above invocation of paranoid_entry stored the GS base + * related information in R/EBX depending on the availability + * of FSGSBASE. + * + * If FSGSBASE is enabled, restore the saved GS base value + * unconditionally, otherwise take the conditional SWAPGS path. + */ + ALTERNATIVE "jmp nmi_no_fsgsbase", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE + + wrgsbase %rbx + jmp nmi_restore + +nmi_no_fsgsbase: + /* EBX == 0 -> invoke SWAPGS */ + testl %ebx, %ebx jnz nmi_restore + nmi_swapgs: SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK + nmi_restore: POP_REGS -- 2.20.1