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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id b1sm12713657pfa.202.2020.05.12.14.48.49 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 12 May 2020 14:48:49 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 14:48:48 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai , Alexei Starovoitov , Al Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Christian Heimes , Daniel Borkmann , Deven Bowers , Eric Chiang , Florian Weimer , James Morris , Jan Kara , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , Matthew Garrett , Matthew Wilcox , Michael Kerrisk , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , Mimi Zohar , Philippe =?iso-8859-1?Q?Tr=E9buchet?= , Scott Shell , Sean Christopherson , Shuah Khan , Steve Dower , Steve Grubb , Thibaut Sautereau , Vincent Strubel , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] fs: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC Message-ID: <202005121422.411001F1@keescook> References: <20200505153156.925111-1-mic@digikod.net> <20200505153156.925111-4-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20200505153156.925111-4-mic@digikod.net> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 05:31:53PM +0200, Micka?l Sala?n wrote: > Enable to forbid access to files open with O_MAYEXEC. Thanks to the > noexec option from the underlying VFS mount, or to the file execute > permission, userspace can enforce these execution policies. This may > allow script interpreters to check execution permission before reading > commands from a file, or dynamic linkers to allow shared object loading. Some language tailoring. I might change the first sentence to: Allow for the enforcement of the O_MAYEXEC openat2(2) flag. > Add a new sysctl fs.open_mayexec_enforce to enable system administrators > to enforce two complementary security policies according to the > installed system: enforce the noexec mount option, and enforce > executable file permission. Indeed, because of compatibility with > installed systems, only system administrators are able to check that > this new enforcement is in line with the system mount points and file > permissions. A following patch adds documentation. > > For tailored Linux distributions, it is possible to enforce such > restriction at build time thanks to the CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_STATIC option. > The policy can then be configured with CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT and > CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE. OMAYEXEC feels like the wrong name here. Maybe something closer to the sysctl name? CONFIG_OPEN_MAYEXEC? And I think it's not needed to have 3 configs for this. That's a lot of mess for a corner case option. I think I would model this after other sysctl CONFIGs, and just call this CONFIG_OPEN_MAYEXEC_DEFAULT. Is _disabling_ the sysctl needed? This patch gets much smaller without the ..._STATIC bit. (And can we avoid "static", it means different things to different people. How about invert the logic and call it CONFIG_OPEN_MAYEXEC_SYSCTL?) Further notes below... > [...] > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index 33b6d372e74a..70f179f6bc6c 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #include "internal.h" > #include "mount.h" > @@ -411,10 +412,90 @@ static int sb_permission(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, int mask) > return 0; > } > > +#define OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_NONE 0 Like the CONFIG, I'd stay close to the sysctl, OPEN_MAYEXEC_ENFORCE_... > +#define OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT (1 << 0) > +#define OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE (1 << 1) Please use BIT(0), BIT(1)... > +#define _OMAYEXEC_LAST OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE > +#define _OMAYEXEC_MASK ((_OMAYEXEC_LAST << 1) - 1) > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_STATIC > +const int sysctl_omayexec_enforce = > +#ifdef CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT > + OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT | > +#endif > +#ifdef CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE > + OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE | > +#endif > + OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_NONE; > +#else /* CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_STATIC */ > +int sysctl_omayexec_enforce __read_mostly = OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_NONE; > +#endif /* CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_STATIC */ If you keep CONFIG_OPEN_MAYEXEC_SYSCTL, you could do this in namei.h: #ifdef CONFIG_OPEN_MAYEXEC_SYSCTL #define __sysctl_writable __read_mostly #else #define __sysctl_write const #endif Then with my proposed change to the enforce CONFIG, all of this is reduced to simply: int open_mayexec_enforce __sysctl_writable = CONFIG_OPEN_MAYEXEC_DEFAULT; > + > +/* > + * Handle open_mayexec_enforce sysctl > + */ > +#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && !defined(CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_STATIC) > +int proc_omayexec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, > + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + int error; > + > + if (write) { > + struct ctl_table table_copy; > + int tmp_mayexec_enforce; > + > + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) > + return -EPERM; > + > + tmp_mayexec_enforce = *((int *)table->data); > + table_copy = *table; > + /* Do not erase sysctl_omayexec_enforce. */ > + table_copy.data = &tmp_mayexec_enforce; > + error = proc_dointvec(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); > + if (error) > + return error; > + > + if ((tmp_mayexec_enforce | _OMAYEXEC_MASK) != _OMAYEXEC_MASK) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + *((int *)table->data) = tmp_mayexec_enforce; > + } else { > + error = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); > + if (error) > + return error; > + } > + return 0; > +} > +#endif I don't think any of this is needed. There are no complex bit field interactions to check for. The sysctl is min=0, max=3. The only thing special here is checking CAP_MAC_ADMIN. I would just add proc_dointvec_minmax_macadmin(), like we have for ..._minmax_sysadmin(). > + > +/** > + * omayexec_inode_permission - Check O_MAYEXEC before accessing an inode > + * > + * @inode: Inode to check permission on > + * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_OPENEXEC, %MAY_EXECMOUNT, %MAY_EXEC) > + * > + * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise. > + */ > +static inline int omayexec_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > +{ > + if (!(mask & MAY_OPENEXEC)) > + return 0; > + > + if ((sysctl_omayexec_enforce & OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT) && > + !(mask & MAY_EXECMOUNT)) > + return -EACCES; > + > + if (sysctl_omayexec_enforce & OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE) > + return generic_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); > + > + return 0; > +} More naming nits: I think this should be called may_openexec() to match the other may_*() functions. > + > /** > * inode_permission - Check for access rights to a given inode > * @inode: Inode to check permission on > - * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC) > + * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC, %MAY_OPENEXEC, > + * %MAY_EXECMOUNT) > * > * Check for read/write/execute permissions on an inode. We use fs[ug]id for > * this, letting us set arbitrary permissions for filesystem access without > @@ -454,6 +535,10 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > if (retval) > return retval; > > + retval = omayexec_inode_permission(inode, mask); > + if (retval) > + return retval; > + > return security_inode_permission(inode, mask); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_permission); > diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h > index 79435fca6c3e..39c80a64d054 100644 > --- a/include/linux/fs.h > +++ b/include/linux/fs.h > @@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ extern int sysctl_protected_symlinks; > extern int sysctl_protected_hardlinks; > extern int sysctl_protected_fifos; > extern int sysctl_protected_regular; > +#ifndef CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_STATIC > +extern int sysctl_omayexec_enforce; > +#endif Now there's no need to wrap this in ifdef. > > typedef __kernel_rwf_t rwf_t; > > @@ -3545,6 +3548,8 @@ int proc_nr_dentry(struct ctl_table *table, int write, > void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); > int proc_nr_inodes(struct ctl_table *table, int write, > void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); > +int proc_omayexec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, > + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); > int __init get_filesystem_list(char *buf); > > #define __FMODE_EXEC ((__force int) FMODE_EXEC) > diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c > index 8a176d8727a3..29bbf79f444c 100644 > --- a/kernel/sysctl.c > +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c > @@ -1892,6 +1892,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = { > .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, > .extra2 = &two, > }, > +#ifndef CONFIG_OMAYEXEC_STATIC > + { > + .procname = "open_mayexec_enforce", > + .data = &sysctl_omayexec_enforce, > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0600, > + .proc_handler = proc_omayexec, This can just be min/max of 0/3 with a new macadmin handler. > + }, > +#endif > #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_MODULE) > { > .procname = "binfmt_misc", > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig > index cd3cc7da3a55..d8fac9240d14 100644 > --- a/security/Kconfig > +++ b/security/Kconfig > @@ -230,6 +230,32 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH > If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled, > specify an empty string here (i.e. ""). > > +menuconfig OMAYEXEC_STATIC > + tristate "Configure O_MAYEXEC behavior at build time" > + ---help--- > + Enable to enforce O_MAYEXEC at build time, and disable the dedicated > + fs.open_mayexec_enforce sysctl. > + > + See Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst for more details. > + > +if OMAYEXEC_STATIC > + > +config OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT > + bool "Mount restriction" > + default y > + ---help--- > + Forbid opening files with the O_MAYEXEC option if their underlying VFS is > + mounted with the noexec option or if their superblock forbids execution > + of its content (e.g., /proc). > + > +config OMAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE > + bool "File permission restriction" > + ---help--- > + Forbid opening files with the O_MAYEXEC option if they are not marked as > + executable for the current process (e.g., POSIX permissions). > + > +endif # OMAYEXEC_STATIC > + > source "security/selinux/Kconfig" > source "security/smack/Kconfig" > source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig" > -- > 2.26.2 > Otherwise, yeah, the intent here looks good to me. -- Kees Cook