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Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
To:     "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
CC:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
        Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
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 <CAMe9rOqwbxis1xEWbOsftMB9Roxdb3=dp=_MgK8z2pwPP36uRw@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Message-ID: <f8ce9863-6ada-2bc4-5141-122f64292aba@citrix.com>
Date:   Sat, 16 May 2020 15:09:22 +0100
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On 16/05/2020 03:37, H.J. Lu wrote:
> On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 5:13 PM Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>> Finally seeing as the question was asked but not answered, it is
>> actually quite easy to figure out whether shadow stacks are enabled in
>> the current thread.
>>
>>     mov     $1, %eax
>>     rdsspd  %eax
> This is for 32-bit mode.

It actually works for both, if all you need is a shstk yes/no check.

Usually, you also want SSP in the yes case, so substitute rdsspq %rax as
appropriate.

(On a tangent - binutils mandating the D/Q suffixes is very irritating
with mixed 32/64bit code because you have to #ifdef your instructions
despite the register operands being totally unambiguous.  Also, D is the
wrong suffix for AT&T syntax, and should be L.  Frankly - the Intel
manuals are wrong and should not have the operand size suffix included
in the opcode name, as they are consistent with all the other
instructions in this regard.)

>   I use
>
>         /* Check if shadow stack is in use.  */
>         xorl    %esi, %esi
>         rdsspq  %rsi
>         testq   %rsi, %rsi
>         /* Normal return if shadow stack isn't in use.  */
>         je      L(no_shstk)

This is probably fine for user code, as I don't think it would be
legitimate for shstk to be enabled, with SSP being 0.

Sadly, the same is not true for kernel shadow stacks.

SSP is 0 after SYSCALL, SYSENTER and CLRSSBSY, and you've got to be
careful to re-establish the shadow stack before a CALL, interrupt or
exception tries pushing a word onto the shadow stack at 0xfffffffffffffff8.

It is a very good (lucky?) thing that frame is unmapped for other
reasons, because this corner case does not protect against multiple
threads/cores using the same shadow stack concurrently.

~Andrew