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Date:   Thu, 21 May 2020 10:15:56 -0500
From:   Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc:     x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
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        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Message-ID: <20200521151556.pojijpmuc2rdd7ko@treble>
References: <20200429220732.31602-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
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On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 03:07:06PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
> return/jump-oriented programming attacks.  Details can be found in "Intel
> 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
> 
> This series depends on the XSAVES supervisor state series that was split
> out and submitted earlier [2].
> 
> I have gone through previous comments, and hope all concerns have been
> resolved now.  Please inform me if anything is overlooked.
> 
> Changes in v10:

Hi Yu-cheng,

Do you have a git branch with the latest Shadow Stack and IBT branches
applied?  I tried to apply IBT v9 on top of this, but I guess the SS
code has changed since then and it didn't apply cleanly.

-- 
Josh