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Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v12 00/18] Enable FSGSBASE instructions
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To:     hpa@zytor.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Don Porter <porter@cs.unc.edu>
Cc:     Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
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Date:   Wed, 27 May 2020 11:31:28 +0300
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On Sun, 2020-05-24 at 12:45 -0700, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
> On a related topic (needless to say, this should never have happened
> and is being raised at the highest levels inside Intel):
> 
> There are legitimate reasons to write a root-hole module, the main one
> being able to test security features like SMAP. I have requested
> before a TAINT flag specifically for this purpose, because
> TAINT_CRAP is nowhere near explicit enough, and is also used for
> staging drivers. Call it TAINT_TOXIC or TAINT_ROOTHOLE; it should
> always be accompanied with a CRIT level alert.

Are these flags easy to bump into in the first place for a person with
no prior familarity with the kernel?

/Jarkko