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[136.25.20.203]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j26sm4565759pfr.215.2020.05.28.04.09.24 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 28 May 2020 04:09:25 -0700 (PDT) From: Sargun Dhillon To: keescook@chromium.org Cc: Sargun Dhillon , christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, cyphar@cyphar.com, jannh@google.com, jeffv@google.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, palmer@google.com, rsesek@google.com, tycho@tycho.ws, Matt Denton , Kees Cook Subject: [PATCH v2 2/3] seccomp: Introduce addfd ioctl to seccomp user notifier Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 04:08:57 -0700 Message-Id: <20200528110858.3265-3-sargun@sargun.me> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200528110858.3265-1-sargun@sargun.me> References: <20200528110858.3265-1-sargun@sargun.me> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This adds a seccomp notifier ioctl which allows for the listener to "add" file descriptors to a process which originated a seccomp user notification. This allows calls like mount, and mknod to be "implemented", as the return value, and the arguments are data in memory. On the other hand, calls like connect can be "implemented" using pidfd_getfd. Unfortunately, there are calls which return file descriptors, like open, which are vulnerable to TOC-TOU attacks, and require that the more privileged supervisor can inspect the argument, and perform the syscall on behalf of the process generating the notifiation. This allows the file descriptor generated from that open call to be returned to the calling process. In addition, there is funcitonality to allow for replacement of specific file descriptors, following dup2-like semantics. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon Suggested-by: Matt Denton Cc: Kees Cook , Cc: Jann Horn , Cc: Robert Sesek , Cc: Chris Palmer Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Tycho Andersen --- include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 25 +++++ kernel/seccomp.c | 182 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h index c1735455bc53..c7bfe898e7a0 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h @@ -113,6 +113,27 @@ struct seccomp_notif_resp { __u32 flags; }; +/* valid flags for seccomp_notif_addfd */ +#define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD (1UL << 0) /* Specify remote fd */ + +/** + * struct seccomp_notif_addfd + * @size: The size of the seccomp_notif_addfd datastructure + * @id: The ID of the seccomp notification + * @flags: SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_* + * @srcfd: The local fd number + * @newfd: Optional remote FD number if SETFD option is set, otherwise 0. + * @newfd_flags: Flags the remote FD should be allocated under + */ +struct seccomp_notif_addfd { + __u64 size; + __u64 id; + __u64 flags; + __u32 srcfd; + __u32 newfd; + __u32 newfd_flags; +}; + #define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!' #define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr) #define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) @@ -124,4 +145,8 @@ struct seccomp_notif_resp { #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \ struct seccomp_notif_resp) #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64) +/* On success, the return value is the remote process's added fd number */ +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD SECCOMP_IOR(3, \ + struct seccomp_notif_addfd) + #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 94ae4c7502cc..02b9ba1fbee0 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include enum notify_state { SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT, @@ -77,10 +80,42 @@ struct seccomp_knotif { long val; u32 flags; - /* Signals when this has entered SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */ + /* + * Signals when this has changed states, such as the listener + * dying, a new seccomp addfd message, or changing to REPLIED + */ struct completion ready; struct list_head list; + + /* outstanding addfd requests */ + struct list_head addfd; +}; + +/** + * struct seccomp_kaddfd - container for seccomp_addfd ioctl messages + * + * @file: A reference to the file to install in the other task + * @fd: The fd number to install it at. If the fd number is -1, it means the + * installing process should allocate the fd as normal. + * @flags: The flags for the new file descriptor. At the moment, only O_CLOEXEC + * is allowed. + * @ret: The return value of the installing process. It is set to the fd num + * upon success (>= 0). + * @completion: Indicates that the installing process has completed fd + * installation, or gone away (either due to successful + * reply, or signal) + * + */ +struct seccomp_kaddfd { + struct file *file; + int fd; + unsigned int flags; + + /* To only be set on reply */ + int ret; + struct completion completion; + struct list_head list; }; /** @@ -735,6 +770,41 @@ static u64 seccomp_next_notify_id(struct seccomp_filter *filter) return filter->notif->next_id++; } +static void seccomp_handle_addfd(struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd) +{ + struct socket *sock; + int ret, err; + + /* + * Remove the notification, and reset the list pointers, indicating + * that it has been handled. + */ + list_del_init(&addfd->list); + + ret = security_file_receive(addfd->file); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (addfd->fd == -1) { + ret = get_unused_fd_flags(addfd->flags); + if (ret >= 0) + fd_install(ret, get_file(addfd->file)); + } else { + ret = replace_fd(addfd->fd, addfd->file, addfd->flags); + } + + /* These are the semantics from copying FDs via SCM_RIGHTS */ + sock = sock_from_file(addfd->file, &err); + if (sock) { + sock_update_netprioidx(&sock->sk->sk_cgrp_data); + sock_update_classid(&sock->sk->sk_cgrp_data); + } + +out: + addfd->ret = ret; + complete(&addfd->completion); +} + static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_filter *match, const struct seccomp_data *sd) @@ -743,6 +813,7 @@ static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall, u32 flags = 0; long ret = 0; struct seccomp_knotif n = {}; + struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd, *tmp; mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock); err = -ENOSYS; @@ -755,6 +826,7 @@ static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall, n.id = seccomp_next_notify_id(match); init_completion(&n.ready); list_add(&n.list, &match->notif->notifications); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&n.addfd); up(&match->notif->request); wake_up_poll(&match->notif->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM); @@ -763,14 +835,31 @@ static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall, /* * This is where we wait for a reply from userspace. */ +wait: err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready); mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock); if (err == 0) { + /* Check if we were woken up by a addfd message */ + addfd = list_first_entry_or_null(&n.addfd, + struct seccomp_kaddfd, list); + if (addfd && n.state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) { + seccomp_handle_addfd(addfd); + mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock); + goto wait; + } ret = n.val; err = n.error; flags = n.flags; } + /* If there were any pending addfd calls, clear them out */ + list_for_each_entry_safe(addfd, tmp, &n.addfd, list) { + /* The process went away before we got a chance to handle it */ + addfd->ret = -ESRCH; + list_del_init(&addfd->list); + complete(&addfd->completion); + } + /* * Note that it's possible the listener died in between the time when * we were notified of a respons (or a signal) and when we were able to @@ -1174,6 +1263,95 @@ static long seccomp_notify_id_valid(struct seccomp_filter *filter, return ret; } +static long seccomp_notify_addfd(struct seccomp_filter *filter, + struct seccomp_notif_addfd __user *uaddfd) +{ + struct seccomp_notif_addfd addfd; + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif; + struct seccomp_kaddfd kaddfd; + u64 size; + int ret; + + ret = get_user(size, &uaddfd->size); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = copy_struct_from_user(&addfd, sizeof(addfd), uaddfd, size); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (addfd.newfd_flags & ~O_CLOEXEC) + return -EINVAL; + + if (addfd.flags & ~SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD) + return -EINVAL; + + if (addfd.newfd && !(addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD)) + return -EINVAL; + + kaddfd.file = fget(addfd.srcfd); + if (!kaddfd.file) + return -EBADF; + + kaddfd.flags = addfd.newfd_flags; + kaddfd.fd = (addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD) ? + addfd.newfd : -1; + init_completion(&kaddfd.completion); + + ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + knotif = find_notification(filter, addfd.id); + /* + * We do not want to allow for FD injection to occur before the + * notification has been picked up by a userspace handler, or after + * the notification has been replied to. + */ + if (!knotif) { + ret = -ENOENT; + goto out_unlock; + } + + if (knotif->state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) { + ret = -EINPROGRESS; + goto out_unlock; + } + + list_add(&kaddfd.list, &knotif->addfd); + complete(&knotif->ready); + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); + + /* Now we wait for it to be processed */ + ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&kaddfd.completion); + if (ret == 0) { + /* + * We had a successful completion. The other side has already + * removed us from the addfd queue, and + * wait_for_completion_interruptible has a memory barrier. + */ + ret = kaddfd.ret; + goto out; + } + + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock); + /* + * Even though we were woken up by a signal, and not a successful + * completion, a completion may have happened in the mean time. + */ + if (list_empty(&kaddfd.list)) + ret = kaddfd.ret; + else + list_del(&kaddfd.list); + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock); +out: + fput(kaddfd.file); + + return ret; +} + static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { @@ -1187,6 +1365,8 @@ static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, return seccomp_notify_send(filter, buf); case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID: return seccomp_notify_id_valid(filter, buf); + case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD: + return seccomp_notify_addfd(filter, buf); default: return -EINVAL; } -- 2.25.1