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Peter Anvin" , Dave Hansen , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH v13 08/16] x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 16:13:54 -0400 Message-Id: <20200528201402.1708239-9-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200528201402.1708239-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20200528201402.1708239-1-sashal@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Tony Luck Before enabling FSGSBASE the kernel could safely assume that the content of GS base was a user address. Thus any speculative access as the result of a mispredicted branch controlling the execution of SWAPGS would be to a user address. So systems with speculation-proof SMAP did not need to add additional LFENCE instructions to mitigate. With FSGSBASE enabled a hostile user can set GS base to a kernel address. So they can make the kernel speculatively access data they wish to leak via a side channel. This means that SMAP provides no protection. Add FSGSBASE as an additional condition to enable the fence-based SWAPGS mitigation. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Tony Luck Cc: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index ed54b3b21c39..487603ea51cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -450,14 +450,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void) * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection. * - * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the - * FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ] - * * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still * possible if there's no SMAP protection. */ - if (!smap_works_speculatively()) { + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) || + !smap_works_speculatively()) { /* * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation -- 2.25.1