Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18;
Reply-To: alex.popov@linux.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] gcc-plugins/stackleak: Exclude alloca() from the
 instrumentation logic
To:     Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc:     Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
        Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>,
        Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
        Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
        Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>,
        Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
        Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
        Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>,
        Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
        Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
        Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>,
        Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>,
        Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
        PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
        Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
        Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
        linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
        Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, gcc@gcc.gnu.org,
        notify@kernel.org
References: <20200604134957.505389-1-alex.popov@linux.com>
 <20200604134957.505389-2-alex.popov@linux.com>
 <CAG48ez05JOvqzYGr3PvyQGwFURspFWvNvf-b8Y613PX0biug8w@mail.gmail.com>
From:   Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Autocrypt: addr=alex.popov@linux.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata=
 mQINBFX15q4BEADZartsIW3sQ9R+9TOuCFRIW+RDCoBWNHhqDLu+Tzf2mZevVSF0D5AMJW4f
 UB1QigxOuGIeSngfmgLspdYe2Kl8+P8qyfrnBcS4hLFyLGjaP7UVGtpUl7CUxz2Hct3yhsPz
 ID/rnCSd0Q+3thrJTq44b2kIKqM1swt/F2Er5Bl0B4o5WKx4J9k6Dz7bAMjKD8pHZJnScoP4
 dzKPhrytN/iWM01eRZRc1TcIdVsRZC3hcVE6OtFoamaYmePDwWTRhmDtWYngbRDVGe3Tl8bT
 7BYN7gv7Ikt7Nq2T2TOfXEQqr9CtidxBNsqFEaajbFvpLDpUPw692+4lUbQ7FL0B1WYLvWkG
 cVysClEyX3VBSMzIG5eTF0Dng9RqItUxpbD317ihKqYL95jk6eK6XyI8wVOCEa1V3MhtvzUo
 WGZVkwm9eMVZ05GbhzmT7KHBEBbCkihS+TpVxOgzvuV+heCEaaxIDWY/k8u4tgbrVVk+tIVG
 99v1//kNLqd5KuwY1Y2/h2MhRrfxqGz+l/f/qghKh+1iptm6McN//1nNaIbzXQ2Ej34jeWDa
 xAN1C1OANOyV7mYuYPNDl5c9QrbcNGg3D6gOeGeGiMn11NjbjHae3ipH8MkX7/k8pH5q4Lhh
 Ra0vtJspeg77CS4b7+WC5jlK3UAKoUja3kGgkCrnfNkvKjrkEwARAQABtCZBbGV4YW5kZXIg
 UG9wb3YgPGFsZXgucG9wb3ZAbGludXguY29tPokCVwQTAQgAQQIbIwIeAQIXgAULCQgHAwUV
 CgkICwUWAgMBAAIZARYhBLl2JLAkAVM0bVvWTo4Oneu8fo+qBQJdehKcBQkLRpLuAAoJEI4O
 neu8fo+qrkgP/jS0EhDnWhIFBnWaUKYWeiwR69DPwCs/lNezOu63vg30O9BViEkWsWwXQA+c
 SVVTz5f9eB9K2me7G06A3U5AblOJKdoZeNX5GWMdrrGNLVISsa0geXNT95TRnFqE1HOZJiHT
 NFyw2nv+qQBUHBAKPlk3eL4/Yev/P8w990Aiiv6/RN3IoxqTfSu2tBKdQqdxTjEJ7KLBlQBm
 5oMpm/P2Y/gtBiXRvBd7xgv7Y3nShPUDymjBnc+efHFqARw84VQPIG4nqVhIei8gSWps49DX
 kp6v4wUzUAqFo+eh/ErWmyBNETuufpxZnAljtnKpwmpFCcq9yfcMlyOO9/viKn14grabE7qE
 4j3/E60wraHu8uiXJlfXmt0vG16vXb8g5a25Ck09UKkXRGkNTylXsAmRbrBrA3Moqf8QzIk9
 p+aVu/vFUs4ywQrFNvn7Qwt2hWctastQJcH3jrrLk7oGLvue5KOThip0SNicnOxVhCqstjYx
 KEnzZxtna5+rYRg22Zbfg0sCAAEGOWFXjqg3hw400oRxTW7IhiE34Kz1wHQqNif0i5Eor+TS
 22r9iF4jUSnk1jaVeRKOXY89KxzxWhnA06m8IvW1VySHoY1ZG6xEZLmbp3OuuFCbleaW07OU
 9L8L1Gh1rkAz0Fc9eOR8a2HLVFnemmgAYTJqBks/sB/DD0SuuQINBFX15q4BEACtxRV/pF1P
 XiGSbTNPlM9z/cElzo/ICCFX+IKg+byRvOMoEgrzQ28ah0N5RXQydBtfjSOMV1IjSb3oc23z
 oW2J9DefC5b8G1Lx2Tz6VqRFXC5OAxuElaZeoowV1VEJuN3Ittlal0+KnRYY0PqnmLzTXGA9
 GYjw/p7l7iME7gLHVOggXIk7MP+O+1tSEf23n+dopQZrkEP2BKSC6ihdU4W8928pApxrX1Lt
 tv2HOPJKHrcfiqVuFSsb/skaFf4uveAPC4AausUhXQVpXIg8ZnxTZ+MsqlwELv+Vkm/SNEWl
 n0KMd58gvG3s0bE8H2GTaIO3a0TqNKUY16WgNglRUi0WYb7+CLNrYqteYMQUqX7+bB+NEj/4
 8dHw+xxaIHtLXOGxW6zcPGFszaYArjGaYfiTTA1+AKWHRKvD3MJTYIonphy5EuL9EACLKjEF
 v3CdK5BLkqTGhPfYtE3B/Ix3CUS1Aala0L+8EjXdclVpvHQ5qXHs229EJxfUVf2ucpWNIUdf
 lgnjyF4B3R3BFWbM4Yv8QbLBvVv1Dc4hZ70QUXy2ZZX8keza2EzPj3apMcDmmbklSwdC5kYG
 EFT4ap06R2QW+6Nw27jDtbK4QhMEUCHmoOIaS9j0VTU4fR9ZCpVT/ksc2LPMhg3YqNTrnb1v
 RVNUZvh78zQeCXC2VamSl9DMcwARAQABiQI8BBgBCAAmAhsMFiEEuXYksCQBUzRtW9ZOjg6d
 67x+j6oFAl16ErcFCQtGkwkACgkQjg6d67x+j6q7zA/+IsjSKSJypgOImN9LYjeb++7wDjXp
 qvEpq56oAn21CvtbGus3OcC0hrRtyZ/rC5Qc+S5SPaMRFUaK8S3j1vYC0wZJ99rrmQbcbYMh
 C2o0k4pSejaINmgyCajVOhUhln4IuwvZke1CLfXe1i3ZtlaIUrxfXqfYpeijfM/JSmliPxwW
 BRnQRcgS85xpC1pBUMrraxajaVPwu7hCTke03v6bu8zSZlgA1rd9E6KHu2VNS46VzUPjbR77
 kO7u6H5PgQPKcuJwQQ+d3qa+5ZeKmoVkc2SuHVrCd1yKtAMmKBoJtSku1evXPwyBzqHFOInk
 mLMtrWuUhj+wtcnOWxaP+n4ODgUwc/uvyuamo0L2Gp3V5ItdIUDO/7ZpZ/3JxvERF3Yc1md8
 5kfflpLzpxyl2fKaRdvxr48ZLv9XLUQ4qNuADDmJArq/+foORAX4BBFWvqZQKe8a9ZMAvGSh
 uoGUVg4Ks0uC4IeG7iNtd+csmBj5dNf91C7zV4bsKt0JjiJ9a4D85dtCOPmOeNuusK7xaDZc
 gzBW8J8RW+nUJcTpudX4TC2SGeAOyxnM5O4XJ8yZyDUY334seDRJWtS4wRHxpfYcHKTewR96
 IsP1USE+9ndu6lrMXQ3aFsd1n1m1pfa/y8hiqsSYHy7JQ9Iuo9DxysOj22UNOmOE+OYPK48D
 j3lCqPk=
Message-ID: <70319f78-2c7c-8141-d751-07f28203db7c@linux.com>
Date:   Thu, 4 Jun 2020 18:23:38 +0300
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101
 Thunderbird/68.6.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez05JOvqzYGr3PvyQGwFURspFWvNvf-b8Y613PX0biug8w@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On 04.06.2020 17:01, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 3:51 PM Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote:
>> Some time ago Variable Length Arrays (VLA) were removed from the kernel.
>> The kernel is built with '-Wvla'. Let's exclude alloca() from the
>> instrumentation logic and make it simpler. The build-time assertion
>> against alloca() is added instead.
> [...]
>> +                       /* Variable Length Arrays are forbidden in the kernel */
>> +                       gcc_assert(!is_alloca(stmt));
> 
> There is a patch series from Elena and Kees on the kernel-hardening
> list that deliberately uses __builtin_alloca() in the syscall entry
> path to randomize the stack pointer per-syscall - see
> <https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200406231606.37619-4-keescook@chromium.org/>.

Thanks, Jann.

At first glance, leaving alloca() handling in stackleak instrumentation logic
would allow to integrate stackleak and this version of random_kstack_offset.

Kees, Elena, did you try random_kstack_offset with upstream stackleak?

It looks to me that without stackleak erasing random_kstack_offset can be
weaker. I mean, if next syscall has a bigger stack randomization gap, the data
on thread stack from the previous syscall is not overwritten and can be used. Am
I right?

Another aspect: CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS can be used for guessing kernel stack
offset, which is bad. It should be disabled if random_kstack_offset is on.

Best regards,
Alexander