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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n18si634049ejh.52.2020.06.10.13.01.32; Wed, 10 Jun 2020 13:01:55 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730326AbgFJPtB (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 10 Jun 2020 11:49:01 -0400 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:43498 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728129AbgFJPtB (ORCPT ); Wed, 10 Jun 2020 11:49:01 -0400 Received: from ip5f5af183.dynamic.kabel-deutschland.de ([95.90.241.131] helo=wittgenstein) by youngberry.canonical.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from ) id 1jj2xu-0004Hc-Jb; Wed, 10 Jun 2020 15:48:34 +0000 Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2020 17:48:33 +0200 From: Christian Brauner To: Casey Schaufler Cc: Andrei Vagin , Adrian Reber , Eric Biederman , Pavel Emelyanov , Oleg Nesterov , Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>, Nicolas Viennot , =?utf-8?B?TWljaGHFgiBDxYJhcGnFhHNraQ==?= , Kamil Yurtsever , Dirk Petersen , Christine Flood , Mike Rapoport , Radostin Stoyanov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Serge Hallyn , Stephen Smalley , Sargun Dhillon , Arnd Bergmann , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris , Jann Horn , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE Message-ID: <20200610154833.mb6sypc5dl4yhhe3@wittgenstein> References: <20200603162328.854164-1-areber@redhat.com> <20200603162328.854164-2-areber@redhat.com> <20200609034221.GA150921@gmail.com> <20200609074422.burwzfgwgqqysrzh@wittgenstein> <20200609160627.GA163855@gmail.com> <20200609161427.4eoozs3kkgablmaa@wittgenstein> <20200610075928.GA172301@gmail.com> <37b47c7d-a24e-c453-5168-c383e6c36c9f@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <37b47c7d-a24e-c453-5168-c383e6c36c9f@schaufler-ca.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 08:41:29AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > On 6/10/2020 12:59 AM, Andrei Vagin wrote: > > On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 06:14:27PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > >> On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 09:06:27AM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote: > >>> On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 09:44:22AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > >>>> On Mon, Jun 08, 2020 at 08:42:21PM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote: > > ... > >>>>> PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is needed for C/R and it is protected by > >>>>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN too. > >>>> This is currently capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) (init_ns capable) why is it > >>>> safe to allow unprivileged users to suspend security policies? That > >>>> sounds like a bad idea. > > ... > >>> I don't suggest to remove or > >>> downgrade this capability check. The patch allows all c/r related > >>> operations if the current has CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. > >>> > >>> So in this case the check: > >>> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > >>> return -EPERM; > >>> > >>> will be converted in: > >>> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)) > >>> return -EPERM; > >> Yeah, I got that but what's the goal here? Isn't it that you want to > >> make it safe to install the criu binary with the CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE > >> fscap set so that unprivileged users can restore their own processes > >> without creating a new user namespace or am I missing something? The > >> use-cases in the cover-letter make it sound like that's what this is > >> leading up to: > >>>>>> * Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a resource > >>>>>> manager distributing jobs where users are always running as non-root. > >>>>>> There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and restore long running > >>>>>> jobs. > >>>>>> * Container migration as non-root > >>>>>> * We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating > >>>>>> CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These checkpoint/restore > >>>>>> applications are not meant to be running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > >> But maybe I'm just misunderstanding crucial bits (likely (TM)). > > I think you understand this right. The goal is to make it possible to > > use C/R functionality for unprivileged processes. > > Y'all keep saying "unprivileged processes" when you mean > "processes with less than root privilege". A process with > CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE *is* a privileged process. It would That was me being imprecise. What I mean is "unprivileged user" not "unprivileged process". It makes me a little uneasy that an unprivileged _user_ can call the criu binary with the CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE fscap set and suspend seccomp of a process (Which is what my original question here was about). Maybe this is paranoia but shouldn't suspending _security_ mechanisms be kept either under CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_MAC_ADMIN? Christian