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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id n20si8115308edt.487.2020.06.15.04.16.08; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 04:16:30 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20161025 header.b=qi0c6kyv; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729652AbgFOLNw (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 15 Jun 2020 07:13:52 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35816 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728285AbgFOLNu (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Jun 2020 07:13:50 -0400 Received: from mail-ej1-x643.google.com (mail-ej1-x643.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::643]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8F8B9C061A0E; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 04:13:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ej1-x643.google.com with SMTP id k11so16962670ejr.9; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 04:13:49 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:reply-to:from:date:message-id :subject:to:cc; bh=euLCTMZWFDnM+UhUk22yeD90ZRWscptXj4V7T5Y0zIU=; b=qi0c6kyvRLomw9PtDOFU0BrSEXN4PtOyml+5UuTSAjLCOML/yzNGRQniF2dhXGtL06 3UNEXpOHjE7UubXVcNZrKg1se+2371ZxcFX1rbp+YAdvMUPAJD7hL/imsJT/BzTtbphN YxEAtquhDUsO5JYLLl0d85QBDUznWXumZZkq8Egdj80SjlfRR+TlWGRSt/hQ/F9Lfscq vwvIzwz0MyjXi+KKj649QK4yTYkFrbi8+GATqxgUYxNekgYFBasSKawHiP9UfJfJb5SV BgSS/71r7FqLRSmn9/7jr3BEQCoJGQb/xTnCP4b4RkoFMV03Z+HJBWjpzAIxQlpXeiDs P0fw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:reply-to :from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=euLCTMZWFDnM+UhUk22yeD90ZRWscptXj4V7T5Y0zIU=; b=Qx99DBxE4XBpOvfv4CTFWpzgRM9ZgR+MyUrNgn6yBqlUxCMFbFrxgu331tAJAG2VJE w+j3I0w+HJ17yYEKsE7IPohoWXia+9mJ3yRYcDVoeHwl9IbPEWFh8rNSe4EE8I8Wo70r f2rdisAcZa6+78TK7InxJnTWYn/55qPmZCwnSR8sg1pBMHfdd6cT2tighUt5s1nPWc/Q ULUBm4xV3abmzNe1K/Y6vLNzetwpOi7gIBS8MpBBLda3DGMNj6qgjpSEXYLo4WcXg1u5 NFXL2ZbyHdLPzHzyRdJbTIyRLZg2BjgTChI54QP9nPk+PecLeuOILK+lzFMG8KD9Pu8T 0QRA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533k/LxSLU0MgMVAqgDQfeRYfolhHgkRMAIdU31a7v0wG/g9xerF m6UmW6250HH5Q8868NfFepd/ze4/OAAFvzmMjuQ= X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:3653:: with SMTP id r19mr18093634ejb.246.1592219628157; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 04:13:48 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200430165717.1001605-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> <20200430165717.1001605-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> In-Reply-To: <20200430165717.1001605-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reply-To: mtk.manpages@gmail.com From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 13:13:37 +0200 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] nsproxy: attach to namespaces via pidfds To: Christian Brauner Cc: lkml , Alexander Viro , =?UTF-8?Q?St=C3=A9phane_Graber?= , Linux Containers , "Eric W . Biederman" , Serge Hallyn , Jann Horn , Aleksa Sarai , Linux API Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Hello Christian, Looking at this patch, and commit 303cc571d107b that landed in 5.8-rc1, time namespaces were omitted. I assume this was an accident, since the commit message makes no statement about excluding time namespaces, and even mentions their existence as part of the justification for the patch ("With time namespaces we're looking at about 16 syscalls."). Is a fix needed here? Thanks, Michael On Thu, 30 Apr 2020 at 18:57, Christian Brauner wrote: > > For quite a while we have been thinking about using pidfds to attach to > namespaces. This patchset has existed for about a year already but we've > wanted to wait to see how the general api would be received and adopted. > Now that more and more programs in userspace have started using pidfds > for process management it's time to send this one out. > > This patch makes it possible to use pidfds to attach to the namespaces > of another process, i.e. they can be passed as the first argument to the > setns() syscall. When only a single namespace type is specified the > semantics are equivalent to passing an nsfd. That means > setns(nsfd, CLONE_NEWNET) equals setns(pidfd, CLONE_NEWNET). However, > when a pidfd is passed, multiple namespace flags can be specified in the > second setns() argument and setns() will attach the caller to all the > specified namespaces all at once or to none of them. Specifying 0 is not > valid together with a pidfd. > > The obvious example where this is useful is a standard container > manager interacting with a running container: pushing and pulling files > or directories, injecting mounts, attaching/execing any kind of process, > managing network devices all these operations require attaching to all > or at least multiple namespaces at the same time. Given that nowadays > most containers are spawned with all namespaces enabled we're currently > looking at at least 14 syscalls, 7 to open the /proc//ns/ > nsfds, another 7 to actually perform the namespace switch. With time > namespaces we're looking at about 16 syscalls. > (We could amortize the first 7 or 8 syscalls for opening the nsfds by > stashing them in each container's monitor process but that would mean > we need to send around those file descriptors through unix sockets > everytime we want to interact with the container or keep on-disk > state. Even in scenarios where a caller wants to join a particular > namespace in a particular order callers still profit from batching > other namespaces. That mostly applies to the user namespace but > all container runtimes I found join the user namespace first no matter > if it privileges or deprivileges the container similar to how unshare > behaves.) > With pidfds this becomes a single syscall no matter how many namespaces > are supposed to be attached to. > > A decently designed, large-scale container manager usually isn't the > parent of any of the containers it spawns so the containers don't die > when it crashes or needs to update or reinitialize. This means that > for the manager to interact with containers through pids is inherently > racy especially on systems where the maximum pid number is not > significicantly bumped. This is even more problematic since we often spawn > and manage thousands or ten-thousands of containers. Interacting with a > container through a pid thus can become risky quite quickly. Especially > since we allow for an administrator to enable advanced features such as > syscall interception where we're performing syscalls in lieu of the > container. In all of those cases we use pidfds if they are available and > we pass them around as stable references. Using them to setns() to the > target process' namespaces is as reliable as using nsfds. Either the > target process is already dead and we get ESRCH or we manage to attach > to its namespaces but we can't accidently attach to another process' > namespaces. So pidfds lend themselves to be used with this api. > The other main advantage is that with this change the pidfd becomes the > only relevant token for most container interactions and it's the only > token we need to create and send around. > > Apart from significiantly reducing the number of syscalls from double > digit to single digit which is a decent reason post-spectre/meltdown > this also allows to switch to a set of namespaces atomically, i.e. > either attaching to all the specified namespaces succeeds or we fail. If > we fail we haven't changed a single namespace. There are currently three > namespaces that can fail (other than for ENOMEM which really is not > very interesting since we then have other problems anyway) for > non-trivial reasons, user, mount, and pid namespaces. We can fail to > attach to a pid namespace if it is not our current active pid namespace > or a descendant of it. We can fail to attach to a user namespace because > we are multi-threaded or because our current mount namespace shares > filesystem state with other tasks, or because we're trying to setns() > to the same user namespace, i.e. the target task has the same user > namespace as we do. We can fail to attach to a mount namespace because > it shares filesystem state with other tasks or because we fail to lookup > the new root for the new mount namespace. In most non-pathological > scenarios these issues can be somewhat mitigated. But there are cases where > we're half-attached to some namespace and failing to attach to another one. > I've talked about some of these problem during the hallway track (something > only the pre-COVID-19 generation will remember) of Plumbers in Los Angeles > in 2018(?). Even if all these issues could be avoided with super careful > userspace coding it would be nicer to have this done in-kernel. Pidfds seem > to lend themselves nicely for this. > > The other neat thing about this is that setns() becomes an actual > counterpart to the namespace bits of unshare(). > > Cc: Eric W. Biederman > Cc: Serge Hallyn > Cc: Jann Horn > Cc: Michael Kerrisk > Cc: Aleksa Sarai > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner > --- > Seems that some people do in fact find this useful and I still have > hopes that I can potentially send this for v5.8. I've added some > expanded testing to this whole series to catch any mistakes. > The lifecycle management for various objects was certainly the > most interesting aspect so I'd appreciate a close look. > /* v2 */ > - Michael Kerrisk : > - Michael pointed out that the semantics for setns(nsfd, 0) and > setns(pidfd, 0) are not comparable. setns(pidfd, 0) is now > disallowed completely. Users wanting to attach to all namespaces > should simply specify them explicitly just as with unshare() and > clone3(). > - Jann Horn : > - Jann pointed out that the setns() in its first form wasn't atomic in > that userspace could end up in an intermediate state where e.g. the > process had moved into the target user namespace but failed to move > into the target mount namespace. > In this new version I've removed all intermediate states. There's an > installation/preparation state and a commit state similar to > prepare_creds() and commit_creds(). > --- > fs/nsfs.c | 7 +- > include/linux/proc_fs.h | 6 ++ > kernel/nsproxy.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > 3 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/nsfs.c b/fs/nsfs.c > index 4f1205725cfe..b023c1a367c8 100644 > --- a/fs/nsfs.c > +++ b/fs/nsfs.c > @@ -229,6 +229,11 @@ int ns_get_name(char *buf, size_t size, struct task_struct *task, > return res; > } > > +bool proc_ns_file(const struct file *file) > +{ > + return file->f_op == &ns_file_operations; > +} > + > struct file *proc_ns_fget(int fd) > { > struct file *file; > @@ -237,7 +242,7 @@ struct file *proc_ns_fget(int fd) > if (!file) > return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); > > - if (file->f_op != &ns_file_operations) > + if (!proc_ns_file(file)) > goto out_invalid; > > return file; > diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h > index 45c05fd9c99d..acfd5012db4e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h > +++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h > @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ struct proc_dir_entry *proc_create_net_single_write(const char *name, umode_t mo > proc_write_t write, > void *data); > extern struct pid *tgid_pidfd_to_pid(const struct file *file); > +extern bool proc_ns_file(const struct file *file); > > #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS > /* > @@ -159,6 +160,11 @@ static inline struct pid *tgid_pidfd_to_pid(const struct file *file) > return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); > } > > +static inline bool proc_ns_file(const struct file *file) > +{ > + return false; > +} > + > #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ > > struct net; > diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c > index 2da463bab58a..8cae508acb9c 100644 > --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c > +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c > @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -258,12 +259,53 @@ void exit_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p) > switch_task_namespaces(p, NULL); > } > > +static int check_setns_flags(unsigned long flags) > +{ > + if (!flags || (flags & ~(CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | > + CLONE_NEWNET | CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID | > + CLONE_NEWCGROUP))) > + return -EINVAL; > + > +#ifndef CONFIG_USER_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) > + return -EINVAL; > +#endif > +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWPID) > + return -EINVAL; > +#endif > +#ifndef CONFIG_UTS_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWUTS) > + return -EINVAL; > +#endif > +#ifndef CONFIG_IPC_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWIPC) > + return -EINVAL; > +#endif > +#ifndef CONFIG_CGROUPS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWCGROUP) > + return -EINVAL; > +#endif > +#ifndef CONFIG_NET_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWNET) > + return -EINVAL; > +#endif > + > + return 0; > +} > + > static void put_nsset(struct nsset *nsset) > { > unsigned flags = nsset->flags; > > if (flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) > put_cred(nsset_cred(nsset)); > + /* > + * We only created a temporary copy if we attached to more than just > + * the mount namespace. > + */ > + if (nsset->fs && (flags & CLONE_NEWNS) && (flags & ~CLONE_NEWNS)) > + free_fs_struct(nsset->fs); > if (nsset->nsproxy) > free_nsproxy(nsset->nsproxy); > } > @@ -283,8 +325,14 @@ static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset) > if (!nsset->cred) > goto out; > > - if (flags & CLONE_NEWNS) > + /* Only create a temporary copy of fs_struct if we really need to. */ > + if (flags == CLONE_NEWNS) { > nsset->fs = me->fs; > + } else if (flags & CLONE_NEWNS) { > + nsset->fs = copy_fs_struct(me->fs); > + if (!nsset->fs) > + goto out; > + } > > nsset->flags = flags; > return 0; > @@ -294,6 +342,138 @@ static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset) > return -ENOMEM; > } > > +static inline int validate_ns(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns) > +{ > + return ns->ops->install(nsset, ns); > +} > + > +/* > + * This is the inverse operation to unshare(). > + * Ordering is equivalent to the standard ordering used everywhere else > + * during unshare and process creation. The switch to the new set of > + * namespaces occurs at the point of no return after installation of > + * all requested namespaces was successful in commit_nsset(). > + */ > +static int validate_nsset(struct nsset *nsset, struct pid *pid) > +{ > + int ret = 0; > + unsigned flags = nsset->flags; > + struct user_namespace *user_ns = NULL; > + struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = NULL; > + struct nsproxy *nsp; > + struct task_struct *tsk; > + > + /* Take a "snapshot" of the target task's namespaces. */ > + rcu_read_lock(); > + tsk = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID); > + if (!tsk) { > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + return -ESRCH; > + } > + > + if (!ptrace_may_access(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) { > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + return -EPERM; > + } > + > + task_lock(tsk); > + nsp = tsk->nsproxy; > + if (nsp) > + get_nsproxy(nsp); > + task_unlock(tsk); > + if (!nsp) { > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + return -ESRCH; > + } > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWPID) { > + pid_ns = task_active_pid_ns(tsk); > + if (unlikely(!pid_ns)) { > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + ret = -ESRCH; > + goto out; > + } > + get_pid_ns(pid_ns); > + } > +#endif > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) > + user_ns = get_user_ns(__task_cred(tsk)->user_ns); > +#endif > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + > + /* > + * Install requested namespaces. The caller will have > + * verified earlier that the requested namespaces are > + * supported on this kernel. We don't report errors here > + * if a namespace is requested that isn't supported. > + */ > +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) { > + ret = validate_ns(nsset, &user_ns->ns); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > +#endif > + > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWNS) { > + ret = validate_ns(nsset, mnt_ns_to_common(nsp->mnt_ns)); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_UTS_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWUTS) { > + ret = validate_ns(nsset, &nsp->uts_ns->ns); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > +#endif > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_IPC_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWIPC) { > + ret = validate_ns(nsset, &nsp->ipc_ns->ns); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > +#endif > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWPID) { > + ret = validate_ns(nsset, &pid_ns->ns); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > +#endif > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWCGROUP) { > + ret = validate_ns(nsset, &nsp->cgroup_ns->ns); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > +#endif > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS > + if (flags & CLONE_NEWNET) { > + ret = validate_ns(nsset, &nsp->net_ns->ns); > + if (ret) > + goto out; > + } > +#endif > + > +out: > + if (pid_ns) > + put_pid_ns(pid_ns); > + if (nsp) > + put_nsproxy(nsp); > + put_user_ns(user_ns); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > /* > * This is the point of no return. There are just a few namespaces > * that do some actual work here and it's sufficiently minimal that > @@ -316,6 +496,12 @@ static void commit_nsset(struct nsset *nsset) > } > #endif > > + /* We only need to commit if we have used a temporary fs_struct. */ > + if ((flags & CLONE_NEWNS) && (flags & ~CLONE_NEWNS)) { > + set_fs_root(me->fs, &nsset->fs->root); > + set_fs_pwd(me->fs, &nsset->fs->pwd); > + } > + > #ifdef CONFIG_IPC_NS > if (flags & CLONE_NEWIPC) > exit_sem(me); > @@ -326,33 +512,39 @@ static void commit_nsset(struct nsset *nsset) > nsset->nsproxy = NULL; > } > > -static inline int validate_ns(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns) > -{ > - return ns->ops->install(nsset, ns); > -} > - > -SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setns, int, fd, int, nstype) > +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setns, int, fd, int, flags) > { > struct task_struct *tsk = current; > struct file *file; > - struct ns_common *ns; > + struct ns_common *ns = NULL; > struct nsset nsset = {}; > - int err; > - > - file = proc_ns_fget(fd); > - if (IS_ERR(file)) > - return PTR_ERR(file); > + int err = 0; > > - err = -EINVAL; > - ns = get_proc_ns(file_inode(file)); > - if (nstype && (ns->ops->type != nstype)) > + file = fget(fd); > + if (!file) > + return -EBADF; > + > + if (proc_ns_file(file)) { > + ns = get_proc_ns(file_inode(file)); > + if (flags && (ns->ops->type != flags)) > + err = -EINVAL; > + flags = ns->ops->type; > + } else if (pidfd_pid(file)) { > + err = check_setns_flags(flags); > + } else { > + err = -EBADF; > + } > + if (err) > goto out; > > - err = prepare_nsset(nstype, &nsset); > + err = prepare_nsset(flags, &nsset); > if (err) > goto out; > > - err = validate_ns(&nsset, ns); > + if (proc_ns_file(file)) > + err = validate_ns(&nsset, ns); > + else > + err = validate_nsset(&nsset, file->private_data); > if (!err) { > commit_nsset(&nsset); > perf_event_namespaces(tsk); > -- > 2.26.2 > -- Michael Kerrisk Linux man-pages maintainer; http://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ Linux/UNIX System Programming Training: http://man7.org/training/