Received: by 2002:a05:6902:102b:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id x11csp1457583ybt; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 09:06:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxTUy+U1IvVW7iVTHATAil+01LFOqGQqmLR5chtDgo9m/I7cg2mYsdkcJWUfasK8et736tE X-Received: by 2002:aa7:c9c9:: with SMTP id i9mr4679720edt.166.1592496408041; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 09:06:48 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1592496408; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=f1GEkJWdlZIL+mmLUA3Emawmqn+RiGj8cN5nxfj9xc2j1F6rGOL2EwXYIguO1jj1eY qKremjy4QZGGMKPzZ9DLDD9FwLCG2UhT7qyIWpFOA739nh34eTdYkbyWOctLSmrAncxv lH6cxT4jvH5ojzouHP7WMoVUNcQ8BOWVCyG7F35BRaeb0sqYoNoitvkPyqe5LpCOlwsn yvvpsbBFtJmUgOyrOlK/LhkkV/eNXVsD+E+lMLXREtenl831KRryHKIaPcKP5JTj6QRe XtQEP0gbvlVk/WuE78i7B4er/wGv2pKxk6bFg5X95PxgVKB0LE/Xr7B9/JFRwoVG4zUg MQBw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from; bh=Wc/MaWmhl61bO99xSUIgyVRc0C0SZgs3h/5bCoKmlgQ=; b=rkSQ3CNTd4s/oaXgFRELCCpL15j+ZxWtd2WiTwbe2aIZLSn9DypPVL3tYSE3S4zzxh D9WhGxoseD+lXx8tPwIftCnACUS5MSaf8o45f4oYrEUqsVBjOddzVcR1PGG6jt3oZj9i zjfSDmoy51Gq58MjE4ELR5V6lyCDHqt3BmeQKqkOEIVhXGm0OYU1HoP1pIaKP90jvuyx fj3rMIKKOcad46jSZBX+ukvxCKNj0DbyXH2tsbAmB0poxndTLYoUT9PSD63vuuavDhjE vdTZJpoqOa2aGWQ4ofMqi3sd9RdlnbWLIlkA/QZww4o1v66uma/dHJOCTzctfJVfnpm7 6HPA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id mb11si2016973ejb.325.2020.06.18.09.06.23; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 09:06:48 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731790AbgFRQEW (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 18 Jun 2020 12:04:22 -0400 Received: from lhrrgout.huawei.com ([185.176.76.210]:2332 "EHLO huawei.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731753AbgFRQEU (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Jun 2020 12:04:20 -0400 Received: from lhreml736-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.7.107]) by Forcepoint Email with ESMTP id 688362462C46C0D090A2; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 17:04:19 +0100 (IST) Received: from fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) by lhreml736-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.87) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1913.5; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 17:04:19 +0100 Received: from roberto-HP-EliteDesk-800-G2-DM-65W.huawei.com (10.204.65.160) by fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256) id 15.1.1913.5; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 18:04:18 +0200 From: Roberto Sassu To: , CC: , , , Roberto Sassu , Subject: [PATCH 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if the HMAC key is loaded Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 18:01:25 +0200 Message-ID: <20200618160133.937-3-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20200618160133.937-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> References: <20200618160133.937-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Originating-IP: [10.204.65.160] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhreml704-chm.china.huawei.com (10.201.108.53) To fraeml714-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.33) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Granting metadata write is safe if the HMAC key is not loaded, as it won't let an attacker obtain a valid HMAC from corrupted xattrs. evm_write_key() however does not allow it if any key is loaded, including a public key, which should not be a problem. This patch allows setting EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES if the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag is not set. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu --- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index cfc3075769bb..92fe26ace797 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * keys are loaded. */ if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) && - ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) && + ((evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0) && !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) return -EPERM; -- 2.17.1