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Date:   Thu, 25 Jun 2020 17:59:57 -0500
From:   Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc:     Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
        Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
        kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/12] ima: Support additional conditionals in the
 KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
Message-ID: <20200625225957.GC4694@sequoia>
References: <20200623003236.830149-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
 <20200623003236.830149-13-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
 <1593125804.27152.426.camel@linux.ibm.com>
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On 2020-06-25 18:56:44, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-06-22 at 19:32 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> > Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
> > ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
> > the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
> > writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
> > and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.
> > 
> > Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
> > this:
> > 
> >  dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
> >  dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
> >  dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
> >  measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
> >  measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
> >  measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE
> > 
> > The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a
> > kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to
> > measure or not
> > 
> > Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be
> > used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why
> > those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than
> > ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately
> > bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the
> > full list of conditional comparisons.
> 
> This makes a lot of sense.
> 
> <snip>
> ?
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > index c1583d98c5e5..82acd66bf653 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> > @@ -731,13 +731,15 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
> >   * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
> >   * @func: IMA hook
> >   * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
> > + * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
> >   * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed
> >   *
> >   * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
> >   */
> >  void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
> >  				const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
> > -				int pcr, const char *keyring)
> > +				int pcr, struct inode *inode,
> > +				const char *keyring)
> >  {
> 
> The file descriptor is passed as the first arg to
> process_measurement(). ?Sorry for the patch churn, but could we do the
> same for process_buffer_measurements. ?As much as possible lets keep
> them in same.

Yep! That makes sense to me.

Tyler

> 
> thanks,
> 
> Mimi