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Message-ID: <1593202992.27152.463.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include
 trusted boot
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>,
        linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     erichte@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com
Date:   Fri, 26 Jun 2020 16:23:12 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20200623202640.4936-2-bmeneg@redhat.com>
References: <20200623202640.4936-1-bmeneg@redhat.com>
         <20200623202640.4936-2-bmeneg@redhat.com>
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On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
<snip>

> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index c1583d98c5e5..a760094e8f8d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
>  	switch (id) {
>  	case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
>  		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
> -		    && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> +		    && arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot()) {
>  			pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
>  			return -EACCES;
>  		}

Only IMA-appraisal enforces file integrity based on policy.

Mimi