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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/11] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook
 is combined with an invalid cond
To:     Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc:     James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
        Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
References: <20200626223900.253615-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
 <20200626223900.253615-7-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
From:   Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Message-ID: <8eb0035d-f326-0299-aa4c-27d3db2deb2a@linux.microsoft.com>
Date:   Sat, 27 Jun 2020 16:39:08 -0700
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On 6/26/20 3:38 PM, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings
> conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors
> don't assume that other conditionals are supported.
> 
> Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
> 
> * v2
>    - No change
> 
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++++
>   1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 676d5557af1a..f9b1bdb897da 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -1018,6 +1018,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>   			if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
>   				return false;
>   
> +			if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
> +					     IMA_KEYRINGS))
> +				return false;
> +
> +			if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
> +				return false;
> +
>   			break;
>   		default:
>   			return false;
> 

Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>