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Date:   Tue, 30 Jun 2020 14:00:43 -0300
From:   Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc:     linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        erichte@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on
 ARCH_POLICY to runtime
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On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 07:00:48AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-06-29 at 20:47 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
>=20
> >=20
> > > I'm not if the "secure_boot" flag is available prior to calling
> > > default_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test
> > > there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg.
> > > IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM) &&
> > > !arch_ima_get_secureboot())
> > >=20
> >=20
> > Well pointed. I built a custom x86 kernel with some workaround to get
> > this flag status within default_appraise_setup() and as a result the
> > flag is was correctly available.=20
> >=20
> > Considering the nature of this flag (platform's firmware (in all
> > arches?)) can we trust that every arch supporting secure/trusted boot
> > will have it available in the __setup() call time?
>=20
> Calling=A0default_appraise_setup() could be deferred.
>=20

Hmmm.. ok, I'm going to investigate it further.
Didn't really know that.

> >=20
> > > > +=09=09/* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be
> > > > +=09=09 * enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing
> > > > +=09=09 * runtime changes */
> > >=20
> > > Only "appraise" rules are enforced.
> > >=20
> >=20
> > Hmm.. do you mean the comment wording is wrong/"could be better",
> > pointing the "appraise" action explicitly?
>=20
> No, it's more than just the comment. =A0Like "trusted boot", IMA-
> measurement only measures files, never enforces integrity.
> =A0"ima_appraise" mode is only applicable to IMA-appraisal.

ah! Ok, I see it now and in fact it shouldn't be part of the check
alongside secureboot.

Well, I'm going to rethink the approach entirely then.
As you said, only deferring default_appraise_setup() may be probably
enough.

Thanks Mimi.

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