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[23.128.96.18]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id i13si3267593ejy.649.2020.07.01.01.07.20; Wed, 01 Jul 2020 01:07:43 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) client-ip=23.128.96.18; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 23.128.96.18 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728823AbgGAIGP (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 1 Jul 2020 04:06:15 -0400 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:2413 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728539AbgGAIEZ (ORCPT ); Wed, 1 Jul 2020 04:04:25 -0400 IronPort-SDR: D1/kF3CPEZz69m98BBC7EVJnrP9v8BhbF7FT8wwJe+uYDLUOuuS5Ilc+gu8mYxe/L3+B6FNw7U Cu/oB2vIrMvA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9668"; a="145581852" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.75,299,1589266800"; d="scan'208";a="145581852" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 01 Jul 2020 01:04:19 -0700 IronPort-SDR: T/46yqb6MTgFgR70xah2N11zDNTNCFFc8QPVsWnK6209N82B025OUsyNv0ikGSSmNw642oeLP/ /whbcHrD4/6w== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.75,299,1589266800"; d="scan'208";a="455010254" Received: from unknown (HELO local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com) ([10.239.159.128]) by orsmga005.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 01 Jul 2020 01:04:16 -0700 From: Yang Weijiang To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, jmattson@google.com Cc: yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com, Yang Weijiang Subject: [PATCH v13 03/11] KVM: VMX: Set guest CET MSRs per KVM and host configuration Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 16:04:03 +0800 Message-Id: <20200701080411.5802-4-weijiang.yang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.2 In-Reply-To: <20200701080411.5802-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> References: <20200701080411.5802-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org CET MSRs pass through guest directly to enhance performance. CET runtime control settings are stored in MSR_IA32_{U,S}_CET, Shadow Stack Pointer(SSP) are stored in MSR_IA32_PL{0,1,2,3}_SSP, SSP table base address is stored in MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, these MSRs are defined in kernel and re-used here. MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP are used for user-mode protection,the MSR contents are switched between threads during scheduling, it makes sense to pass through them so that the guest kernel can use xsaves/xrstors to operate them efficiently. Other MSRs are used for non-user mode protection. See SDM for detailed info. The difference between CET VMCS fields and CET MSRs is that,the former are used during VMEnter/VMExit, whereas the latter are used for CET state storage between task/thread scheduling. Co-developed-by: Zhang Yi Z Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi Z Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index d52d470e36b1..97e766875a7e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -3020,6 +3020,13 @@ void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3) vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3); } +static bool is_cet_state_supported(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 xss_states) +{ + return ((supported_xss & xss_states) && + (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || + guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))); +} + int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); @@ -7098,6 +7105,42 @@ static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4)); } +static void vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap; + bool incpt; + + incpt = !is_cet_state_supported(vcpu, XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER); + /* + * U_CET is required for USER CET, and U_CET, PL3_SPP are bound as + * one component and controlled by IA32_XSS[bit 11]. + */ + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_U_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, + incpt); + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, + incpt); + + incpt = !is_cet_state_supported(vcpu, XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL); + /* + * S_CET is required for KERNEL CET, and PL0_SSP ... PL2_SSP are + * bound as one component and controlled by IA32_XSS[bit 12]. + */ + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, + incpt); + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, + incpt); + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, + incpt); + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, + incpt); + + incpt |= !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK); + /* SSP_TAB is only available for KERNEL SHSTK.*/ + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, MSR_TYPE_RW, + incpt); +} + static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); @@ -7136,6 +7179,9 @@ static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vmx_set_guest_msr(vmx, msr, enabled ? 0 : TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE); } } + + if (supported_xss & (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)) + vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(vcpu); } static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index c5835f9cb9ad..6390b62c12ed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -186,6 +186,9 @@ static struct kvm_shared_msrs __percpu *shared_msrs; | XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR | XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512 \ | XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) +#define KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS (XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL) + u64 __read_mostly host_efer; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_efer); -- 2.17.2