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Hallyn" Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/11] ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function Message-ID: <20200701143852.GG4694@sequoia> References: <20200626223900.253615-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> <20200626223900.253615-12-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> <20200701080416.GC3878@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200701080416.GC3878@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2020-07-01 16:04:16, Dave Young wrote: > Hi, > On 06/26/20 at 05:39pm, Tyler Hicks wrote: > > Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task > > ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to > > the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when > > writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, > > and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations. > > > > Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like > > this: > > > > dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t > > dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t > > dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t > > measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK > > measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK > > measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE > > > > The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a > > kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to > > measure or not > > > > Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be > > used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why > > those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than > > ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately > > bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the > > full list of conditional comparisons. > > > > Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks > > Cc: Eric Biederman > > Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org > > --- > > > > * v2 > > - Moved the inode parameter of process_buffer_measurement() to be the > > first parameter so that it more closely matches process_masurement() > > > > include/linux/ima.h | 4 ++-- > > kernel/kexec_file.c | 2 +- > > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 23 +++++++++++++++----- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 17 +++++---------- > > security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 2 +- > > 9 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h > > index 9164e1534ec9..d15100de6cdd 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/ima.h > > +++ b/include/linux/ima.h > > @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > > enum kernel_read_file_id id); > > extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); > > extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); > > -extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size); > > +extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC > > extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); > > @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) > > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > } > > > > -static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {} > > +static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} > > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ > > > > #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC > > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > index bb05fd52de85..07df431c1f21 100644 > > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c > > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c > > @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, > > goto out; > > } > > > > - ima_kexec_cmdline(image->cmdline_buf, > > + ima_kexec_cmdline(kernel_fd, image->cmdline_buf, > > image->cmdline_buf_len - 1); > > } > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > > index 59ec28f5c117..ff2bf57ff0c7 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > > @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, > > struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, > > int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, > > struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); > > -void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, > > +void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, > > const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, > > int pcr, const char *keyring); > > void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > > index bf22de8b7ce0..4f39fb93f278 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c > > @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, > > > > /** > > * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. > > - * @inode: pointer to inode to measure > > + * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated > > * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate > > * @secid: secid of the task being validated > > * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > index a9649b04b9f1..6c52bf7ea7f0 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, > > > > rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize); > > if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) > > - process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize, > > + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize, > > "blacklisted-hash", NONE, > > pcr, NULL); > > } > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c > > index aaae80c4e376..1c68c500c26f 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c > > @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, > > * if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked > > * to the given keyring. > > */ > > - process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len, > > + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len, > > keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0, > > keyring->description); > > } > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > index 8351b2fd48e0..8a91711ca79b 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > @@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > > > > /* > > * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. > > + * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) > > * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. > > * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). > > * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. > > @@ -735,7 +736,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > > * > > * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. > > */ > > -void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, > > +void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, > > const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, > > int pcr, const char *keyring) > > { > > @@ -768,7 +769,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, > > */ > > if (func) { > > security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > > - action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, > > + action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, > > &pcr, &template, keyring); > > if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) > > return; > > @@ -823,16 +824,26 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, > > > > /** > > * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args > > + * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded > > * @buf: pointer to buffer > > * @size: size of buffer > > * > > * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. > > */ > > -void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) > > +void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) > > { > > - if (buf && size != 0) > > - process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", > > - KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL); > > + struct fd f; > > + > > + if (!buf || !size) > > + return; > > + > > + f = fdget(kernel_fd); > > + if (!f.file) > > + return; > > + > > + process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size, > > + "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL); > > + fdput(f); > > } > > > > static int __init init_ima(void) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > > index 5eb14b567a31..294323b36d06 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > > @@ -443,13 +443,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, > > { > > int i; > > > > - if ((func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) || (func == KEY_CHECK)) { > > - if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) { > > - if (func == KEY_CHECK) > > - return ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred); > > - return true; > > - } > > - return false; > > + if (func == KEY_CHECK) { > > + return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && > > + ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred); > > } > > if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && > > (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) > > @@ -1007,10 +1003,9 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > > if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) > > return false; > > > > - if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR)) > > - return false; > > - > > - if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) > > + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID | > > + IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | > > + IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME)) > > return false; > > > > break; > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c > > index 56ce24a18b66..69a8626a35c0 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c > > @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) > > > > list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) { > > if (!timer_expired) > > - process_buffer_measurement(entry->payload, > > + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload, > > entry->payload_len, > > entry->keyring_name, > > KEY_CHECK, 0, > > -- > > 2.25.1 > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > kexec mailing list > > kexec@lists.infradead.org > > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec > > > > Although I still do not understand the deep knowledge of IMA, I > still wonder to know what is the effect to the behavior changes end user > visible. Does it work with a kernel built-in commandline? eg no > cmdlien passed at all. Ah, very good question. This IMA hook (KEXEC_CMDLINE) only measures the string passed to the cmdline argument of the kexec_file_load(2) syscall. However, kernel commandline options injected into a kernel with the CONFIG_CMDLINE or CONFIG_CMDLINE_EXTEND Kconfig options would still be measured, as part of the vmlinux as a whole, by the KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK IMA hook. Tyler > > Thanks > Dave